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for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Research Report 1698

# Impact of a Battalion-Level Peacekeeping Mission on the Sponsoring Army National Guard Division

Monte D. Smith  
Hughes Training Inc., Link Operations

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**Research Report 1698**

# **Impact of a Battalion-Level Peacekeeping Mission on the Sponsoring Army National Guard Division**

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## FOREWORD

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In compliance with the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty protocol of 1981, the U.S. Army has participated in a Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) peacekeeping mission in the Sinai Desert. Traditionally, this participation has involved a 6-month rotational deployment of a battalion-sized Active Component (AC) infantry unit. Recently, however, a composite battalion of AC and Reserve Component (RC) soldiers was deployed, with the latter coming primarily from the Army National Guard's 29th Infantry Division (Light). The purpose of this rotation was to evaluate the ability of AC and RC soldiers to blend into a military unit capable of effectively performing a real-world mission, and thereby determine if the concept should be continued or not. This report documents the home-station personnel, training, and readiness impact of peacekeeping requirements on the 29th Infantry Division (Light) both during and after its period of mission sponsorship.

The research was conducted by the U.S. Army Research Institute's Multinational Force and Observers Task Force and Reserve Component Training Research Unit (RCTRU) under work package 6952 "Multinational Force and Observers (MFO): Rotation #28," which is organized under the "Manpower and Personnel" program area.

The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel sponsored this research. Results have been presented to Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Chief and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; Chief, National Guard Bureau; Director, Army National Guard; Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Forces Command; and Deputy Chief, Army Reserve.

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# IMPACT OF A BATTALION-LEVEL PEACEKEEPING MISSION ON THE SPONSORING ARMY NATIONAL GUARD DIVISION

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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### Research Requirement:

This report assesses the impact upon the 29th Infantry Division (Light) of participating in a Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) peacekeeping (PK) mission in the Sinai Desert.

### Procedure:

Nine maneuver battalions of the 29th ID(L) contributed approximately 90% of PK volunteers. Senior leaders from these battalions were surveyed (twice) and interviewed (once) to determine what training and personnel impacts their units had experienced. A stratified random sample of junior leaders/soldiers from these units was also surveyed, along with active Army readiness advisors and soldiers who had volunteered for the mission but subsequently withdrew.

### Findings:

All surveyed groups endorsed the idea of Army National Guard (ARNG) participation in active duty assignments such as the PK mission. Participation in the PK mission was a source of pride and an indication of the ARNG's ability to contribute effectively to world peace. Positive impacts on morale and family support were reported. Senior leaders initially thought the mission's impact on training activities and on combat readiness would be negative, but over time they shifted to a more positive stance, particularly after volunteers were reassigned to their units. Senior leader judgments appeared to be mediated by extent of troop loss. Senior leaders who reported negative impacts experienced relatively large percentage troop losses to the PK mission. Soldiers and leaders criticized the manner in which recruitment was conducted, particularly the lack of adequate advance notice and lack of timely feedback on the selection process.

### Utilization of Findings:

For soldiers of the 29th ID(L), participation in the PK mission was a morale builder, and they would like to see ARNG participation in similar missions. Close attention should be paid, however, to their recommendations for improving the recruitment process. To avoid negative impact on combat readiness, personnel losses to individual units should be closely monitored. Recruitment should be conducted from the largest practicable volunteer pool in order to minimize the potential impact on individual units.

# IMPACT OF A BATTALION-LEVEL PEACEKEEPING MISSION ON THE SPONSORING ARMY NATIONAL GUARD DIVISION

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## Impact of a Battalion-Level Peacekeeping Mission on the Sponsoring Army National Guard Division

### Background

In compliance with the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the terms of the Egyptian – Israeli peace treaty protocol signed in 1981, the U.S. Army has participated in a Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) peacekeeping (PK) mission in the Sinai Desert. This mission has involved noncombat military operations (exclusive of self-defense) designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of the existing treaty.

The Army's PK contribution in the Sinai has traditionally involved the 6-month rotational deployment of a battalion-sized Active Component (AC) unit, often drawn from the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. Recently, however, a call for volunteers was made throughout the 29th Infantry Division (Light), to identify 401 Army National Guard (ARNG) soldiers for participation in this active duty mission. Subsequently, the call was extended to other ARNG units. In addition to these ARNG volunteers, the active Army and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) contributed 155 soldiers.

Once identified, these soldiers (comprising 4th Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment), participated in four phases of PK mission activity. During Phase I (Unit Stand-Up; April - October 1994) key members of the battalion (e.g., commander and executive officer, staff officers, company-level officers and noncommissioned officers [NCOs]) reported to Fort Bragg for leader training. During Phase II (Predeployment Training; October - December 1994), the entire battalion underwent training related to the conduct of specific PK operations. During Phase III (Deployment and Employment; January - July 1995), the battalion deployed to the Sinai Desert and conducted required PK operations on site. During Phase IV (Redeployment and Stand-Down; July 1995) the battalion redeployed stateside. During these phases, the participating battalion was part of a test to evaluate the ability of AC and Reserve Component (RC) soldiers to blend into a military unit capable of effectively performing a real-world overseas PK mission, and thereby determining whether the concept should be continued.

### Objective

In conjunction with this test, the U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) conducted/sponsored a two-part research effort. Part 1, which was performed primarily in-house by ARI staff, examined personnel, training, and family support issues affecting the deploying battalion (i.e., the 4th Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment). Part 2, the subject of this report, assessed the effect of PK requirements on the sponsoring ARNG division (i.e., the 29th ID[L]). The purpose of this report is to document lessons learned from Part 2 of the ARI research effort, provide sufficient information upon which to determine if AC/RC unit composition for PK missions is a good idea that should be continued, and facilitate the planning and execution of any future PK

missions involving RC participation and sponsorship. All observations, conclusions, and recommendations in this report concern the impact of the PK mission upon operations of the 29th ID(L). This report does not address the effectiveness of ARNG soldiers while serving in the Sinai.

### Issue Identification

During the period from July 8 through Aug 19, 1994, Hughes-Link conducted consultations with a variety of parties in order to gain a better understanding of the research issues surrounding the PK mission. The central objective throughout this series of consultations was to identify potential impacts that might be experienced by the 29th ID(L) in the areas of personnel and training as a result of PK sponsorship. Meetings were held with the following individuals and groups: the government delivery order contracting officer's representative (DO-COR), the ARI MFO Task Force leader, other representatives from the Army Research Institute-Reserve Component Training Research Unit (ARI-RCTRU), ARI representatives and researchers in the ARI Alexandria, Virginia office, National Guard Bureau (NGB) representatives, and leadership at 29th ID(L) Headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Based on these consultations, it was concluded that if measurable personnel impacts occurred, they would be observed in such areas as morale, unit cohesiveness, family support, attitudes toward PK volunteers and the PK mission, military commitment, and adjustments required to accommodate the return of the PK volunteers upon their stateside redeployment. It was anticipated that training impact most likely would be manifest in the loss of personnel during their volunteer PK duty, resulting in longer working hours for troops remaining in the 29th ID(L), possible modifications to Annual Training goals, reduced training of mission essential tasks, reduced participation in special training events such as Lanes Training, increased use of Additional Training Assemblies or Readiness Management Assemblies, and possible changes in the following areas: combat readiness, leadership capability, the ability of soldiers to perform mission essential tasks, and weapons qualification capability.

### Documenting the PK Mission Impact

Based on information provided by 29th ID(L) leadership, it was determined that 401 volunteers from the 29th ID(L) would constitute approximately 4% of full divisional strength. If these volunteers were drawn randomly from across all divisional elements, the impact of resulting personnel reductions could be expected to be negligible. However, it was apparent that the impact upon the division would not be uniformly distributed. Because of specific Duty Military Occupational Specialty (D-MOS) requirements of the PK mission, it was expected that the vast majority of volunteers would come from the nine maneuver battalions of three brigades. If this expectation was borne out, it seemed reasonable to focus the investigation on those units most likely to be impacted: the nine maneuver battalions. The first step, therefore, in assessing the impact of the PK mission on the 29th ID(L) was to determine the relative extent to which



each unit within the division was impacted by personnel loss. Units experiencing the most personnel loss to the PK volunteer mission would serve as the focus of the research.

To accomplish this step, a database was established containing all volunteers, listed by unit, rank, and MOS. This information was provided by 29th ID(L) Headquarters. Using this database, it was determined that 763 soldiers from the 29th ID(L) had initially volunteered for the PK mission. These volunteers were attached to 37 different units of the 29th ID(L). Of the 763 volunteers, 390 were accepted.

Table 1 summarizes these data. In the table, columns distinguish volunteers who were selected for the PK mission (the first column under Volunteers) from those who were not selected for the mission (the second column under Volunteers). Rows in the table identify the units of the 29th ID(L) to which volunteers were attached at the time they volunteered. The first nine rows identify the nine maneuver battalions of the division's three brigades.

Although the data in Table 1 changed over time (some volunteers subsequently changed their minds about serving in the Sinai, for example), they nevertheless indicate that the personnel impact of the PK mission upon the 29th ID(L) was likely to be manifest predominantly upon the nine maneuver battalions. Based on the Table 1 data, 81% of all volunteers and 92% of accepted volunteers came from these nine battalions.

Only five units outside the maneuver battalions produced more than 1% of total volunteers, and volunteers from those five units were not accepted at a high rate (only 8 out of 98). Outside the maneuver battalions, only one unit produced as many as 1% of accepted volunteers.

The pattern of results in Table 1 is partly determined, of course, by staffing requirements of the MFO PK mission, which made heavy demands (at every level of enlisted and NCO rank) on soldiers with the 11B (Infantryman) MOS. Soldiers with the qualifying 11B MOS were concentrated in the maneuver battalions. Although the information in Table 1 changed during the course of the volunteer mission, it nonetheless alerted the research team to the probability that the three maneuver battalions would experience the brunt of personnel losses. From the preliminary numbers, it appeared that all nine battalions would be impacted substantially, but that the extent of the impact would vary considerably across the units.

Several months elapsed between the time when soldiers initially volunteered for the PK mission and when they were eventually notified of their acceptance. During this time, many volunteers changed their minds about serving in the Sinai. (Reasons for attrition are explored in a later section of this report.) The 29th ID(L) eventually contributed 294 soldiers to the mission. (A national call for volunteers was issued, and another 107 ARNG volunteers were selected from 22 other states.) The final composition of the deploying PK battalion is presented in Table 2.

Table 1.

Source (by Unit) of 29th ID(L) PK Volunteers.

Unit	Volunteers		Total	Unit	Volunteers		Total
	Selected	Not Selected			Selected	Not Selected	
1/116th	40	15	55	129LRSD	1	0	1
2/116th	35	32	67	129SIG	0	3	3
3/116th	72	56	128	2/29th	3	0	3
1/170th	43	36	79	529FSB	1	3	4
1/183rd	38	42	80	340SB	1	0	1
1/115th	47	35	82	ITD	1	8	9
2/115th	42	27	69	729FSB	1	2	3
1/175th	24	15	39	E-111	0	1	1
2/175th	17	3	20	3/172nd	1	0	1
29RAO	1	0	1	2/111th	1	3	4
229ENG	3	26	29	DISCOM	1	1	2
HHC29th	1	28	29	1/102nd	1	0	1
1/29th	1	1	2	DIVARTY	0	1	1
429 FSB	6	0	6	1/158th	2	0	2
3/29th	1	8	9	116thSUP	0	1	1
129FA	0	1	1	1/246th	0	1	1
2/110th	2	20	22	229thMSB	1	1	2
3/111th	0	3	3	20th	1	0	1
HHCSTA	1	0	1	Total	390	373	763

Table 2

Composition of the PK Mission (4th Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment)

Number	Source
401	ARNG
(294)	(29th ID[L])
(107)	(Other ARNG)
110	Active Army
45	USAR
556	Total

Table 3

Volunteers Lost to the PK Mission from Each of 9 Maneuver Battalions

Unit	Number of Volunteers Lost	Perce- tage Impact
1/116th	38	11.44%
2/116th	27	6.51%
3/116th	53	12.01%
1/170th	26	6.56%
1/183rd	16	4.02%
1/115th	32	6.16%
2/115th	32	8.29%
1/175th	18	6.77%
2/175th	23	5.40%
Total	265	7.40%

The preponderance (90.1%) of the 29th ID(L)'s 294 volunteers came from the nine maneuver battalions. The right hand column of Table 3 shows the proportional contribution of each battalion to the mission. In every battalion, the number of soldiers in Table 3 is less than the number of initial volunteers who were accepted (see the first 9 data rows in Table 1). The correspondence between the numbers in Table 3 and those in the first 9 data rows of Table 1, however, is substantial ( $r = .82$ ,  $p < .01$ ), indicating that the rate of attrition was approximately equal across the nine battalions. The last column in Table 3 shows the proportion of each battalion's total personnel lost to the PK mission.

From the perspective of the 29th ID(L), it would have been advantageous to distribute MOS 11B requirements proportionally across all nine battalions. In this way, the personnel impact on any given battalion would have been minimized. Moreover, opportunity to participate in an unusual mission with possible career development implications would have been made available to soldiers in all units.

From a research design perspective, however, drawing volunteers from all nine battalions complicated matters, because it precluded the use of unaffected battalions (within the brigades) as comparable comparison groups. Table 3 makes clear that although some units had higher volunteer impact rates than others, all nine battalions were impacted by the PK mission.

Although unaffected units were not available to use as controls, examination of the percentage impact column in Table 3 shows that some units (e.g., the 3/116th) were impacted substantially more than others (e.g., the 1/183rd). The range of personnel impact was from a low of 4.02%% to a high of 12.01%. While this range is not great in absolute terms, it is substantial in relative terms: some units experienced up to three times the proportional loss of personnel as other units. It is also well to recognize that the eventual impact of personnel loss is most keenly felt not at the battalion level, but rather at the company level. In some instances, one or two companies within a battalion absorbed proportionally more losses than other companies. For that reason, personnel impact was eventually measured at the company level. Whenever possible, differential personnel impact was taken into consideration in the interpretation of other measures collected as part of this investigation. Admittedly, such comparisons lacked experimental rigor and were more correlational in nature. In most instances, they consisted of examining the relationship between training performance and the proportion of troops lost from individual units (i.e., companies) to the PK mission.

## Method

The impact of an innovative assignment like the Sinai PK mission can be measured in two ways. One method consists of examining unit personnel and training records for evidence of impacts that can be attributed to PK activities. This method can be described as archival because it utilizes records that are routinely generated by units of the 29th ID(L) and maintained by either 29th ID(L) Headquarters or by NGB Headquarters. The other method, which is a more direct approach, is to identify individuals in the 29th ID(L) who are in the best position to observe

impacts in either training or personnel areas, and ask them what changes (if any) were necessitated by PK activities. These data are obtainable from questionnaires and structured interviews.

### Archival Data Sources

Archival data have two advantages. Because they are already routinely collected and maintained, they can be acquired with a minimum of intrusion. Archival measures, however, have major shortcomings. Archival data are at best indirect measures because they were never intended to reflect impacts of specific extraneous events such as the Sinai PK mission. Because they are indirect measures, they may not be sufficiently focused to reflect impacts of specific extraneous activities. Moreover, as indicators of PK impact, they embody a host of other shortcomings: (1) Most available measures are compiled either quarterly or annually. These measurement cycles may not be conducive to reflecting PK mission impacts. (2) The way the measures are collected (i.e., the way the questions are asked) is changed from time to time. These changes can inadvertently produce sudden disruptions in the underlying trend. Unless the complete history of each instrument is known, changes in underlying trend, caused by nothing more than a change on a data collection form, can be confused with impacts of extraneous events, such as the PK mission. (3) Even if no changes occur in the measuring instruments themselves, any fluctuations appearing in the underlying data trend may be caused by factors unrelated to PK activities, and yet erroneously attributed to the PK mission. (4) Some of the archival data (such as Unit Status Report readiness measures) are classified, and hence their acquisition, secure storage, dissemination, and discussion pose special problems.

Notwithstanding these drawbacks, archival measures have the potential to supplement other data sources, such as questionnaire and interview methodologies. For this reason, data from a number of archival sources were examined for potential utility, while keeping in mind the caveats listed above. The archival source which proved to be most useful, for purposes of this investigation, was the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System - Army National Guard (SIDPERS - ARNG) database, which contains basic information at the level of the individual soldier, such as rank, home mailing address, Armed Forces Qualification Test percentile score, educational history, and social security number. None of these data was used as outcome measures to assess the impact of the PK mission, but the SIDPERS source was invaluable for such purposes as verifying mailing address, rank, and unit assignment, and for structuring stratified random samples of soldiers from the 29thID(L).

Other archival data sources were less useful. The following alternative archival data sources were evaluated for their potential merit as indicators of PK mission impact: Yearly Training Briefs (YTB), Consolidated Weapons Qualification Reports, Combat Training Center (CTC) Participation, Skills Qualification Test (SQT) and Soldier Development Test (SDT) records, Nonqualified Personnel Duty Rosters, First U.S. Army Training Evaluations, Unit Status Reports (USR), and Training Assessment Model (TAM) data. The two archival sources with the greatest promise were the USR, for training readiness assessments, and TAM data, for specific training

and personnel measures. Both USR and TAM are compiled and maintained at the unit level. TAM, which are compiled annually, were made available by 29th ID(L) Headquarters, and USR reports, which are compiled quarterly, are maintained by NGB. Even these two sources, however, which initially seemed to have substantial promise, eventually proved to have extremely limited applicability.

USR reports focus on unit readiness measures and cover such areas as personnel turnover, assigned and available strength, MOS qualified percentage, and commander ratings of training readiness. Some USR data, however, are classified. Because of its classified status, USR data were not used in the current evaluation.

TAM measures are used in assessing unit training effectiveness and readiness. TAM provide a personnel summary (e.g., strength, turnover, percentage D-MOS, educational attainments) and a training summary (e.g., training accomplishments during the previous 12 months and an assessment of the unit's effectiveness in performance of mission essential tasks).

TAM measures probably serve admirably for the purposes for which they were designed. For purposes of evaluating the impact of the PK mission, however, they have no utility. Major changes in the forms used to collect and store data occurred between 1993 and 1994, precluding all efforts at establishing stable baselines on relevant measures. Moreover, major year-to-year and unit-to-unit inconsistencies were noted, such as those listed below:

- External evaluation by AC sponsors were not required each year.
- AC sponsors did not use standardized evaluation methodologies.
- External evaluators varied in grade and experience.
- AT training levels (e.g., squad/platoon/company), sites, and training events (e.g., National Training Center (NTC), Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and Lanes) varied.
- AT attendance among the 9 maneuver battalions fluctuated from 38% to 81%.

#### Questionnaire and Interview Data Sources

Due to multiple uncontrolled and potentially contaminating influences, and the inability to establish a stable baseline on potentially relevant archival variables, it was decided to custom design the major assessment measures. An approach using a combination of questionnaires and interviews was selected. This approach has in its favor directness and timeliness, because the questions could be asked during those time periods when changes, if they occurred, were likely to be most salient to those in the best positions to observe them. The approach is flexible as well as direct because it can embody multiple measurement occasions and can be followed by interviews which permit custom-tailored probing of areas that are difficult to assess via questionnaires.

The major disadvantage of questionnaire and interview data is the intrusiveness of the measurement process itself. The act of measurement can bias responses if there are perceived

pressures to respond in certain ways. However, this approach can yield objective and reliable data if questions are phrased in a non-biased manner, participants see the process as non-threatening, and the element of intrusiveness is kept to a minimum.

Accordingly, questionnaires and interview protocols were designed for the specific purpose of measuring impacts of the PK mission. Questionnaires were administered to both senior leaders and junior leaders/soldiers of the 29th ID(L). Questionnaire data were collected from senior leaders on two occasions, and from junior leaders/soldiers once. Questionnaires also were presented to members of an AC readiness group who served as advisors to the 29th ID(L) on matters of training and preparedness. Senior leaders who completed both questionnaires were subsequently interviewed by phone. And finally, junior leaders/soldiers who had volunteered for the mission but subsequently withdrew were also contacted by phone and interviewed.

### Participants

Senior leadership sample. On the basis of their duty assignments, 112 senior leaders in the 29th ID(L) were identified as qualified to observe and evaluate impacts that occurred as a result of PK participation. Questionnaires were directed to the company commanders and 1st sergeants of all 36 companies of the nine maneuver battalions (combined  $n = 72$ ), as well as battalion commanders, staff training officers, and sergeants major (combined  $n = 27$ ), and brigade commanders, staff training officers, and sergeants major (combined  $n = 9$ ). Additionally, at the division level, questionnaires were directed to the Chief of Staff, personnel and training officers, and the Sergeant Major (combined  $n = 4$ ). A total of 112 senior leaders constituted the potential data collection population.

Junior leader/soldier sample. SIDPERS was used to identify the potential population from which a stratified sample of junior leaders/soldiers was structured. Eligible sampling units consisted of all soldiers in the nine maneuver battalions of the 29th ID(L), excluding soldiers serving in the PK mission, and also excluding senior leaders included in the senior leadership survey.

Using SIDPERS data, soldiers were stratified by rank, and grouped into those who were considered likely to be platoon leaders (officers), platoon sergeants (E7-E8), squad leaders (E5-E6), and other squad members (E1-E4). In consultation with the project COR, surveys were mailed to all platoon leaders (168 were in the population), and all high-level NCOs (107 E7-E8s were in the population). SPSS sampling routines were used to structure random samples of 400 E5-E6s (from among 992 available), and 200 E1-E4s (from among 1,982 available). The final sample consisted of 875 individuals.

AC readiness groups. Two AC readiness groups (which served as advisors to the 29th ID(L) on matters of training and preparedness) were contacted and asked to participate in the evaluation. One of these groups agreed to participate and questionnaires were received from all of its 7 members (5 NCOs, 1 captain, and 1 major). This group was responsible for advising 5 of



the 9 maneuver battalions of the 29th ID(L), including the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of the 116IN, the 1-170IN, and the 1-183IN.

Junior leaders/soldiers who volunteered but subsequently changed their minds ("No Shows"). With the concurrence of ARI-RCTRU, the Boise, Idaho office of Hughes Training – Link Operations requested a list of soldiers from the 29th ID(L) who had initially volunteered for the Sinai PK mission but subsequently withdrew prior to commencement of training. The list, provided by 29th ID(L) Headquarters, contained 57 names. Interviews were conducted by telephone in January 1995 in an effort to determine why they had changed their minds about serving on the PK mission. Thirty-seven of the 57 soldiers were interviewed by telephone in January 1995.

### Senior Leadership Questionnaires

Senior leadership questionnaires were administered on two occasions: (1) approximately 60 days after troops departed for PK mission training, and (2) approximately 180 days after departure, but prior to re-deployment. By taking measurements twice, it was possible to determine if disruptions were uniform across the duration of the PK mission, or if distinct peaks and valleys occurred. Questionnaires were delivered via mail, and were designed so as to require no more than 1 hr to complete. Phone calls were used extensively in cases of non-response, to encourage participation. Ultimately, however, participation was on a voluntary basis. Because one of the key concerns was if reactions to the PK mission changed over time, it was decided at the outset of the investigation to base statistical analyses only on senior leaders who completed both questionnaires.

Senior leadership questionnaires probed both personnel and training impacts of the PK mission. Areas of potential personnel impact that were examined included: morale and unit cohesiveness changes caused by the PK mission, perceived changes in family support, senior leadership attitudes toward the PK mission, senior leadership perceptions of attitudinal and morale changes in personnel under their command caused by PK mission activities, and willingness to volunteer for future PK missions. Areas of potential training impact included: extent of personnel loss, impact on senior leader working hours, adjustments in training goals necessitated by PK activities, and changes in combat readiness, leadership capability, capability of soldiers in the unit to perform mission essential tasks, and weapons qualification capability. Whenever responses indicated that the PK mission necessitated personnel or training changes in their units, additional questions were asked in order to document details of the impacts and to determine what adjustments were necessary. For instance, if a senior leader said that training had to be altered as a result of PK activities, that senior leader was also asked to specify the elements of training that had to be altered, and to provide details of the required alterations.

Morale and unit cohesiveness. It was anticipated that units most heavily impacted by personnel losses might experience problems with morale or unit cohesiveness. This could have occurred if troops in the 29th ID(L) experienced increased work load requirements or increased



work stress as a result of personnel reductions. It was also recognized, however, that morale and unit cohesiveness might be boosted by participation in the PK mission. ARNG units could take pride in the knowledge that troops were actively contributing to world peace through participation in the PK mission. In any event, it was determined that assessment of changes in morale and unit cohesiveness was important to an overall evaluation of the mission's impact on the 29th ID(L).

Family support. It was anticipated that substantial changes in units' capability to provide support to volunteer families had to occur in order for the test to be successful. ARNG units typically are trained at or near home station. Most units are not prepared to offer support for families when Guard members are deployed for long periods to distant locations. Units' ability to rise to the occasion and implement necessary family support services would be an important element in establishing mission success.

Attitudes and military commitment. PK activities like the Sinai mission will be possible among ARNG units only if residual personnel (those not actively participating in the mission) are supportive. A second important element of support is willingness to volunteer for a similar mission in the future.

Personnel loss and working hours. Senior leaders were asked to specify the number of troops lost to the PK mission and the percentage of unit strength that the volunteers represented. It was anticipated that longer hours would be directly linked to percentage of lost personnel, and that percentage of lost unit strength might explain other reactions to the PK mission.

Changes to training plans. It was not known what impact, if any, the PK mission would have on unit training activities. It was possible that the mission might result in reduced training across-the-board, and require the modification of Annual Training goals. Or the impact could be manifest through reduced availability of special training (e.g., LANES Training). Conversely, personnel shortages might have been seen as a mandate to conduct more training, or to conduct the same types of training more intensively, so that the same goals could be achieved with fewer personnel. It was even possible that the PK mission might have produced reduced training in some units and increased (or intensified) training in other units, depending upon how the pattern of personnel impact was distributed across the various units.

Questions concerning training impact followed a general-to-specific approach. General questions probed whether training impacts occurred; that is, whether training had to be changed as a result of the PK mission. More specific questions then pinpointed what changes, if any, had to be implemented, and whether these changes were in level (i.e., overall increases or decreases in training compared to before the PK mission), or in the kinds of training made available (e.g., changes in the training mix), or perhaps a need to modify Annual Training goals. If responses to the general questions indicated that no training impacts occurred, the questions about specific areas of impact were skipped.

Appendix A contains the first senior leadership questionnaire. Appendix B contains the second questionnaire. The second questionnaire is shorter than the first because it was not necessary to ask all question sequences a second time.

### Junior Leader/Soldier Questionnaires

To the extent possible, junior leader/soldier questionnaires covered the same questions that were asked of senior leaders. In many areas, however, questions asked of junior leaders were inappropriate for junior leaders/soldiers. For that reason, the junior leader/soldier questionnaire (see Appendix C) was abbreviated in some areas. Junior leader/soldier questionnaires were administered 4 months after PK volunteers departed for training.

### Readiness Group Questionnaires

The commander of one AC readiness group, which was serving in an advisory capacity to the 29th ID(L) on matters of training and preparedness, agreed to have readiness advisors in his unit complete questionnaires designed to measure changes that had occurred within units of the 29th ID(L) as a result of the PK mission. (See Appendix D for a copy of the readiness questionnaire.) As far as possible, this questionnaire was designed to probe the same issues that were posed to senior leaders and junior leader/soldiers of the 29th ID(L).

### Senior Leaders' Interview Data

Approximately 90 days after PK troops re-deployed to home units, Hughes-Link personnel attempted to conduct telephone interviews with the 71 senior leaders from the 29th ID(L) who had completed both previous questionnaires. The timing of the interviews was selected in order to provide an optimal opportunity to assess attitudes about the PK mission after it was completed but before memory of its impact faded. The interview protocol was designed to allow follow-up questions on themes that emerged from mailed questionnaire data. It also had the flexibility to pursue other issues as they arose spontaneously during interview sessions. Reassignment of the troops who had participated in the Sinai PK mission was one area of focus. Attention was also given to determining if returning troops were better trained than when they had left, and whether their return would impact the unit's combat readiness and morale. All interviews were conducted by one senior researcher from Hughes's Boise, Idaho office.

### "No Shows' " Interview Data

These interviews, collected by telephone in January, 1995, sought to better understand the PK mission recruitment process. Specifically, the interviews delved into reasons why some soldiers initially volunteered for Sinai assignments but subsequently changed their minds about serving on the mission. Preliminary questions established the conditions under which these volunteers had first been approached, including the amount of information that had been made available to them and whether they had felt pressured to volunteer for the mission.

After these preliminary questions, the interview procedure followed a "funnel" approach, in which the first step was to identify all influences that had entered into the decision process, regardless of the relative importance of any of the influences. Once all the influences had been identified, an attempt was made to evaluate their relative importance. Finally, the soldiers were asked to pinpoint the single reason that had been most influential in their decision to withdraw from the volunteer force. An open-ended question, asked near the conclusion of the interview, asked each interviewee to suggest ways to improve the call-up process. All interviews were conducted by one senior researcher from Hughes's Boise, Idaho office.

#### Results:

Questionnaire Data for the 29th ID(L)  
and Interview Data for "No Shows"

#### Questionnaire Return Rates

Senior leader return rates. Completed questionnaires on both measurement occasions were received from 71 of the identified senior leaders. Duty assignments included 23 company commanders, 24 1st sergeants, and 24 commanders, staff training officers, or command sergeants major at the battalion or brigade level. For analysis purposes, all battalion-level (or above) senior leaders were combined into one group to facilitate comparisons with company commanders and company NCOs. Returns from the nine battalions were relatively uniform, and duty positions within battalions were also evenly distributed, as indicated in Table 4.

Junior leader/soldier return rates. Return rates varied substantially by rank, as indicated in Table 5. Overall, 196 completed questionnaires were returned, for a return rate of 24.0%.

#### Training Impact of the PK Mission

Training was one of the two most broadly impacted areas of functioning. (Family Support was the other.) Approximately half of 29th ID(L) senior leaders and junior leaders/soldiers reported that the PK mission impacted training (see Table 6). Senior leaders initially rated the impact as negative, by almost a 2-to-1 margin. By the second measurement occasion, however, senior leaders had shifted substantially in their evaluations, with the same proportion (23.9%) reporting positive and negative impacts. Junior leaders/soldiers, on the other hand, reported a positive impact by approximately a 2-to-1 margin.

Table 7 shows how senior leaders shifted toward a less negative view of training impact. The first column of Table 7 (under the Time 1 label) shows the number of senior leaders who initially reported positive training impact, no impact, or negative training impact. The next three columns show how senior leaders within each (Time 1) rating category subsequently evaluated the training impact of the PK mission. It can be seen in the first data row of the table that of the 13 senior leaders who reported a positive impact at Time One, 6 also reported a positive impact at

Time 2, 6 shifted by one position to a rating of no impact, and 1 senior leader who was initially positive shifted two rating positions to give a negative rating at Time 2.

Table 4

Return Rates for Duty Position Within Battalion

Battalion	Duty Position			Row Totals
	Co NCOs	Co CMDR's	Battalion	
1/116th	4	2	2	8
2/116th	3	4	3	10
3/116th	2	3	5	10
1/170th	2	2	2	6
1/183rd	3	2	3	8
1/115th	2	3	3	8
2/115th	3	2	1	6
1/175th	4	2	2	8
2/175th	1	3	3	7
Totals	24	23	24	71

Table 5

Composition of the 29th ID(L) Junior Leader/Soldier Sample

Rank	# Mailed	Undeliv- erables	Adjusted Base	Adjusted Returns	Return Rate
Officers	168	13	155	55	35.5%
E7-E8	107	3	104	47	45.2%
E5-E6	400	22	378	77	20.4%
E1-E4	200	20	180	17	9.4%
TOTALS	875	58	817	196	24.0%

Table 6

## Training Impact of the PK Mission

	Sr. Leaders at Time 1 (%)	Sr. Leaders at Time 2 (%)	Jr. Leaders/ Soldiers
Had an Impact	52.1	47.8	48.5
Positive	18.3	23.9	33.2
Negative	33.8	23.9	15.3
No Impact	45.1	52.1	50.0
Don't Know	2.8	0.0	1.5

In the second data row of Table 7, it can be seen that senior leaders who reported no training impact at Time 1 also tended to report no impact at Time 2. Of those who shifted, there was an approximately equal tendency to shift to either positive or negative ratings.

Table 7

## Time 1 and Time 2 Senior Leaders' Training Impact Ratings

Time 1	Time 2		
	Positive n = 16	No Impact n = 36	Negative n = 17
Positive (n = 13)	6	6	1
No Impact (n = 32)	5	23	4
Negative (n = 24)	5	7	12

It was among senior leaders who were initially negative, however, that the greatest degree of shifting occurred. Twenty-nine percent of senior leaders with an initially negative impact rating subsequently shifted their ratings to no impact, and another 21% shifted from their initial negative rating all the way to a positive rating. Although shifting in training impact ratings occurred in all three categories (Positive, No Impact, and Negative), there was more shifting from negative-to-positive than from positive-to-negative.

Amount of training impact. Senior leaders and junior leaders/soldiers who reported that the PK mission impacted their unit's training activities (in either a positive or negative direction) were asked to rate the magnitude of the impact, using a 5-pt scale where a rating of 1 indicated "minor impact" and a rating of 5 indicated "major impact." Table 8 presents mean ratings for magnitude of training impact. Means for positive impact are in the first data row, and means for negative impact are in the second row. The last two data rows present the results of analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests of significance between positive and negative means. For junior leaders/soldiers, and for senior leaders at Time 1, positive impact did not differ significantly from negative impact. At Time 2, however, senior leader positive impact was significantly greater than senior leader negative impact ( $p < .05$ ).

Table 8 also illustrates how senior leaders shifted toward more positive views over time. Although mean ratings of amount of change at Time 1 were equivalent for negative and positive impact groups, almost twice as many senior leaders reported negative impacts as positive impacts, so the absolute (or net) impact at Time 1 was negative. At Time 2, however, the number reporting positive impacts equaled the number reporting negative impacts. Moreover, the amount of positive impact at Time 2 was significantly greater than the amount of negative impact. Across time, senior leaders of the 29th ID(L) changed from a decidedly negative position, to a significantly positive one. (Junior leaders/soldiers were pro PK mission at the one time they were questioned.)

Table 8

Magnitude of Positive and Negative Training Impact (Means)

Direction of Impact	Sr. Leaders at Time 1	Sr. Leaders at Time 2	Jr. Leaders/Soldiers
Positive Impact	2.08 ( $\underline{n} = 13$ )	2.71 ( $\underline{n} = 17$ )	2.78 ( $\underline{n} = 65$ )
Negative Impact	2.27 ( $\underline{n} = 22$ )	2.00 ( $\underline{n} = 17$ )	2.43 ( $\underline{n} = 30$ )
$F(df)$	$< 1(1, 33)$	$4.59(1, 33)$	$1.86(1, 93)$
$p$	ns	$< .05$	ns

Unit adaptability. Regardless of whether senior leaders thought the training impact of the PK mission was positive or negative, they were confident of their units' ability to adapt to changing circumstances. When asked to rate the extent to which their units had been able to adjust to training impacts caused by the PK mission, mean ratings were in excess of 4.0 on a 5-pt scale,

regardless of whether they had evaluated the training impact of the mission as positive or negative.

Relationship between troop loss and senior leader judgments of training impact. Percentage of unit strength lost to the PK mission varied substantially across units. Five senior leaders reported losing only 1% of troop strength. Three senior leaders, however, lost 12% of their troops, and almost a fifth of senior leaders reported losing 10% or more of their troops to the mission. Not surprisingly, percentage of unit strength lost to the mission was related, especially early in the mission, to senior leaders' propensity to rate the mission's training impact as positive or negative (see Table 9).

Table 9

The Association Between Average Percentage of Troop Loss and Training Impact Ratings

Training Impact Rating	%of Unit Strength Lost to the PK mission			
	Time 1		Time 2	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Positive Change	5.3	3.3	6.5	3.2
No Change	5.7	2.5	5.5	2.9
Negative Change	7.7	3.2	8.2	2.5

Figure 1 shows the relationship between Time 1 ratings of positive, neutral, or negative training impact and mean percentage of unit strength lost to the PK mission. An ANOVA of troop loss data indicated a significant difference,  $F(2, 60) = 3.65$ ,  $p < .05$ , among the displayed means. (Eta squared = .1084.) Because the comparison of primary interest was between positive and negative training impact groups, a second ANOVA was conducted using only these two groups. This test indicated that the reported percentage of unit strength lost to the mission was significantly greater among senior leaders reporting a negative training impact than among those reporting a positive training impact,  $F(1, 31) = 4.25$ ,  $p < .05$ . (Eta squared = .1205.)

An ANOVA of troop loss data based on training impact ratings given by senior leaders at Time 2 also produced a significant outcome,  $F(2, 60) = 3.84$ ,  $p < .05$ . (Eta squared = .1134.) A follow-up comparison of negative and positive training impact groups, however, yielded a nonsignificant result at Time 2,  $F(1, 25) = 2.05$ ,  $p > .05$ . Figure 2 shows the relationship




Figure 1. The relationship between mean percentage of unit strength lost to the PK mission and training impact ratings at Time 1.




Figure 2. The relationship between mean percentage of unit strength lost to the PK mission and training impact ratings at Time 2.



between Time 2 ratings of positive, neutral, or negative training impact and mean percentage of unit strength lost to the PK mission. Newman-Keuls pair-wise comparisons indicated that the only significant comparison was between negative and no impact groups ( $p < .05$ ).

Impact on training plans, standards, and schedules. Senior leaders were asked if the PK mission had required changes in Annual Training plans or in training standards, required more special training, or caused critical training to be delayed. Responses to these questions are summarized in Table 10. Few senior leaders reported changes or impacts at either Time 1 or Time 2, but uncertainty concerning the mission's eventual impact increased dramatically across the two measurement occasions. Senior leaders who responded "no" to these questions at Time 1 tended to shift to a "don't know" stance at the second measurement occasion.

Table 10

Auxiliary Training Issues (Senior Leaders)

Training Issue	Time 1 (%)			Time 2 (%)		
	Yes	No	Dk	Yes	No	Dk
Training Plan Changed?	4	88	7	9	51	41
Training Standards Changed?	3	59	38	0	32	68
More Need for Special Training?	13	51	37	4	26	69
Critical Training Delayed?	3	58	39	1	30	68

Note. Dk = Don't know.

A similar series of questions was asked of junior leaders/soldiers in the 29th ID(L). Responses were consistent with those obtained from senior leaders, indicating that although there had been some training impact, it had been minor. Only 3.6% of junior leaders/soldiers reported that the PK mission had caused a delay in their own training. Somewhat more junior leaders/soldiers said they had received additional training (11.2%), or assumed additional duties (21.9%) as a result of the PK mission, and 9.7% of junior leaders/soldiers thought the PK mission might lead to promotion opportunities.

Increased work hours. When asked if their soldiers were required to work longer hours as a result of the PK mission, 15.5% of senior leaders said yes at Time 1, and 14.1% said yes at Time 2. Senior leaders were also asked if they were personally working longer hours as a result of the PK mission. Affirmative responses were given by 14.7% at Time 1 and by 15.5% at Time 2. The mean number of weekly extra work hours reported by senior leaders at Time 1 was 3.80. By Time 2 that mean had dropped to 3.09. Seventy percent of senior leaders who reported longer hours at Time 1 also reported longer hours at Time 2, indicating that the effect tended to last throughout the duration of the mission. For senior leaders reporting longer work hours at both

Times 1 and 2, the mean additional weekly hours were 3.57 and 2.86 at the two measurement occasions. This decrement was statistically non-significant, as indicated by a correlated-samples test,  $t(6) = 0.53$ ,  $p > .05$ .

One junior leader/soldier in 10 (10.2%) reported working longer hours as a result of the PK mission. The average number of additional weekly work hours (for the 10.2% of junior leaders/soldiers affected) was 4.15.

### The PK Mission's Impact Upon Morale

Approximately a third of both junior leaders/ soldiers and senior leaders said the PK mission had impacted morale in their units. Of those who reported an impact, the direction of the impact was predominantly in the positive direction (see Table 11).

Table 11

Has There Been A Change in Morale?

Direction of Change	Sr. Leaders at Time 1 (%)	Sr. Leaders at Time 2 (%)	Jr. Leaders/ Soldiers (%)
Positive Change	33.8	28.2	33.9
Negative Change	2.8	4.2	4.2
No Change	63.4	67.6	62.0

Among senior leaders, perceptions of morale change varied substantially by duty position. The highest levels of perceived positive morale change were reported by company commanders (see Table 12). Reports of negative morale change were negligible, regardless of duty position.

In the junior leader/soldier survey, judgments of positive morale impact varied substantially by rank (see Table 13). Officers (consisting predominantly of lieutenants) were most likely to report a positive morale impact. Few reports of negative morale change occurred at any rank among the junior leaders/soldiers. The mean amount of positive morale change (as measured on a 5-pt scale where 1 = minor change, and 5 = major change), was 2.5 at Time 1 and 2.85 at Time 2 for senior leaders, and 2.86 for junior leaders/soldiers at the one time they were assessed.

Table 12

## Perceived Positive Morale Change By Duty Position

Duty Position	Time 1 (%)	Time 2 (%)
NCOs	16.0	16.7
Co Cmdrs	52.0	39.1
Battalion	33.3	29.2
Total	33.8	28.2

Table 13

## Source of Perceived Positive Morale Change Among Junior Leaders/Soldiers

% Reporting Positive Morale Change By Rank				
Officers	E7-E8	E5-E6	E1-E4	Total
53.7	31.9	27.6	0.0	33.7

Future Participation and Reassignment of Volunteers

When asked if the 29th ID(L) should participate in more assignments like the PK mission, the vast majority of junior leaders/soldiers and senior leaders replied "yes." Senior leaders unanimously endorsed this prospect at Time 1, and it was affirmed by 98.6% of senior leaders at Time 2. Endorsement by junior leaders/soldiers was almost as widespread, at 92.7%.

Fewer than one senior leader in five (15.7%) had volunteered for the current PK mission. When asked if they would volunteer for a future PK mission, however, 38.0% of senior leaders said yes at Time 1 (see Table 14). This proportion had grown to 46.5% by Time 2. The increase from Time 1 to Time 2 in senior leaders' professed willingness to volunteer for future missions came principally from senior leaders at the battalion level.

Almost a quarter of junior leaders/soldiers (24.5%) said they had volunteered for the current PK mission, and 36.7% said they would volunteer for a future mission. One junior leader/soldier in five (22.6%), however, said they did not receive sufficient information about the PK mission to make an informed decision about volunteering. Lower ranking junior leaders/soldiers were

somewhat more likely to report insufficient information than higher ranking junior leaders/soldiers.

Table 14

Percentage of Senior Leaders Who Would Volunteer for a Future PK Mission

Duty Position	Time 1 %	Time 2 %
NCOs	40.0	41.7
Co Cmdrs	40.0	43.5
Battalion	33.3	54.2
Total	38.0	46.5

Among senior leaders, 16.9% said they did not have sufficient information to make a decision about volunteering for the PK mission. Reports of inadequate information among senior leaders were concentrated at the company NCO level, as shown in Table 15.

Table 15

Information Adequacy for Decision Making Among Senior Leaders

Did You Have Enough Information to Make A Decision?				
Answer	NCOs	Co Cmdrs	Battalion	Total
Yes (%)	72.7	87.0	90.9	86.2
No (%)	27.3	13.0	9.1	16.9

Reassignment. At Time 1, only about a third of senior leaders said they had been briefed on how PK soldiers would be integrated back into their units. Table 16 indicates that at Time 1 the proportion of senior leaders saying they had been briefed was uniform across duty positions. By Time 2, the proportion reporting they had been briefed had grown substantially (see Table 16), but not uniformly across duty positions. Approximately 70% of senior leaders at battalion and company commander levels had been briefed, but the proportion among company NCOs was substantially less, and hardly changed from the Time 1 level.

Table 16

## Senior Leaders Reporting They Had Been Briefed on PK Troop Return

Duty Position	Time 1 (%)	Time 2 (%)
NCOs	32.0	37.5
Co Cmdrs	32.0	69.7
Battalion	33.3	70.8
Total	32.4	59.2

Only one senior leader in five anticipated problems with integrating PK volunteers back into their units. This figure varied little from Time 1 (18.3%) to Time 2 (19.7%). Approximately 1 junior leader/soldier in 6 (15.9%) anticipated problems following the return of the PK volunteers. The most frequently anticipated concern was that PK mission volunteers – especially the better soldiers among them – would attempt to stay with the 82nd, or would otherwise seek active duty assignments rather than returning to their ARNG units. It was conjectured that attrition of the better soldiers in this manner would weaken overall performance capability of home units. Somewhat paradoxically, the only other anticipated problem to receive more than scattered mention was that slots/positions would not be available for returning soldiers because of anticipated unit restructuring and/or consolidations.

The Recruitment Process (Including “No Shows” Interview Results)

Improving the recruitment process: junior leader/soldier perspective. Two-thirds of junior leaders/soldiers (68.7%) said the PK recruitment process could have been improved, and many junior leaders/soldiers suggested specific steps for improvement. Junior leaders’/soldiers’ written comments are contained in Appendix E. Their comments contained over three dozen specific suggestions, including two recurrent themes: information and timing. Junior leaders/soldiers said they needed more and better information, with exact dates and precise details of what would be expected of them during all phases of the mission: recruitment, training, and deployment. The two most recommended methods for receiving the information were briefings by PK mission veterans and in-depth informational videos. They were especially sensitive to issues of timing, and complained that they had not been given sufficient advance notice to confer adequately with family, employers, and community contacts before making a decision about volunteering. They stated that once they had volunteered, they needed faster feedback concerning whether they had been selected, in order to plan for the forthcoming mission. The long lag between the solicitation of volunteers and subsequent notification of selection was cited by several junior leaders/soldiers as a major reason for inability to follow through with initial intentions. Several junior leaders/soldiers emphasized the need for the Army

to conduct public relations efforts with employers, to impress upon them the importance of the mission and the requirement for having jobs available upon the volunteers' return from the PK mission.

Table 17 lists junior leader/soldier recommendations for improving the recruitment process, in order of their frequency of mention. Recommendations are listed only if they came from at least two junior leaders/soldiers. Full verbatim responses are contained in Appendix E.

Improving the recruitment process: senior leader perspective. A high proportion of senior leaders (91.5%) made suggestions for improving the PK mission recruitment process. Senior leader suggestions heavily emphasized the timing element. They said sufficient prior notice was not given. The short notice was accompanied by pressure to volunteer without adequate information, especially information concerning the anticipated timetable of events. This initial push to volunteer was followed by months without feedback, during which time volunteers had

Table 17

Junior Leaders'/Soldiers' Suggestions on How to Improve the PK Mission Recruitment Process

# Times Mentioned	Suggestion
33	More and/or better and/or more detailed information and clarified expectations
32	Timing issues: Earlier information, faster notification, more advance notice, reduced lag time between volunteering and being notified of selection
10	Guaranteed return employment
9	Briefings by Sinai veterans
7	Mobilize an entire battalion
4	Remove politics from selection process
3	Widen the volunteer pool: entire ARNG
3	Avoid over-promising
2	Don't solicit volunteers and then tell them they're ineligible
2	More division support for the mission
2	Send Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) soldiers
2	Recruit new ARNG soldiers for the mission
2	Open the recruitment to all ranks

Table 18

## Senior Leaders' Suggestions on How to Improve the PK Mission Recruitment Process

# Times Mentioned	Suggestion
19	Timing issues: Earlier information/faster notification/more advance notice/reduce lag time between volunteering and serving
14	Briefings by Sinai veterans/AC representatives
13	More/better/detailed information/clear expectations/timetables/clear eligibility requirements and selection criteria
6	Guaranteed return employment/public relations (PR) with employers
6	Mobilize entire unit/battalion
2	Maintain promotion eligibility during PK tour
2	Widen the volunteer pool: entire ARNG
2	Provide incentives: money/tax breaks/tuition

no idea if they had been accepted or rejected for the mission, or if the mission had been canceled. This period of silence ended abruptly with the application of more pressure to recruit more soldiers for the mission. By this time, many of the volunteers had changed their minds, or made other commitments. To avoid these problems in the future, senior leaders recommended briefings by PK mission veterans, and dissemination of unambiguous eligibility requirements, selection criteria, timetables of events, and (written) expectations. Several senior leaders mentioned that superior performance would result from activation of intact units. Themes which occurred repeatedly in senior leader recommendations are listed in Table 18, in the order of their frequency of mention. Written responses of senior leaders are contained in Appendix F.

"No Show" Interviews. These interviews were conducted among soldiers who had initially volunteered but subsequently changed their minds prior to the reporting date. Thirty-seven of 57 qualifying soldiers were interviewed by telephone in January 1995. Of the 20 soldiers who could not be interviewed, 8 had been classified as Equivalent Training Status, 2 had been discharged for undisclosed reasons, 1 had received a medical discharge, 3 had failed physical training tests, 2 were reported to be in the AC, and 4 were actually in the Sinai. Of the 37 soldiers who were interviewed, over 70% were at grades E3 or E4.

Over 90% of these soldiers had been contacted initially at the armory about volunteering for the PK mission. Individuals who had contacted them varied widely. Company commanders, company 1st sergeants, and battalion commanders accounted for less than half of initial contacts.

Other sources of initial contact included platoon sergeants, readiness NCOs, and "some general from division." One soldier said he first learned of the PK mission by reading about it in the *Army Times*. If these reports can be accepted at face value, they indicate no uniform method of disseminating information about the forthcoming mission. It should be noted, however, that these reports are retrospective (up to 1 yr.), and the multiplicity of reported initial contact sources may partly reflect the normal memory distortion that inevitably occurs with the passage of time.

Over 80% of these soldiers reported they had been contacted initially in either January, February or March of 1994, predominantly in group settings (81.1%). No soldiers reported feeling pressured to volunteer, and 8 out of 10 soldiers (83.8%) said the mission was adequately explained. One soldier did report, however, that he was told to sign up at the time of the initial briefing and promised that more information would be forthcoming later. Another soldier said the briefing was adequate, but that "...after the initial briefing ... they wanted a 'yes' or 'no' at that time without [the opportunity to talk] it over with others. They expected an on-the-spot decision."

The most frequently cited reasons for changing their mind about volunteering were Family (cited by 45.9% of soldiers), followed by Job (32.4%), School (32.4%), Money (16.2%), and Significant Others (13.5%). (Sixty percent of soldiers cited either Family or Significant Others as a reason for changing their minds about the mission.) A variety of other reasons were advanced, including a scorpion bite, a broken leg, divorce, a skiing accident, and a felony conviction. Responses are summarized in Table 19.

Table 19

Did Concerns About Any of the Following Areas Influence Your Decision to Change Your Mind?

Reason	% (N = 37)
Family	45.9
Job	32.4
School	32.4
Money	16.2
Significant Other	13.5
Information	2.7
Military	2.7
Transportation	2.7
Other	18.9

Note. The table total sums to more than 100% because multiple responses were allowed.

Note. "Other" reasons included: Failed physical training test, Wanted to go but was denied, Never volunteered and never told anyone he was interested, No specific reason, Scorpion bite,



Note (cont.). Sick grandmother, Broken leg, Got married, Doctor's orders due to accident, Ski accident, Apprehensive about the Sinai region, Felony conviction, Court could not process papers on his son in time, Divorce, Not enough advance notice.

Note. Multiple "other" responses were allowed.

Soldiers were permitted to cite more than one reason for changing their minds. If soldiers cited multiple reasons, they were asked to identify the "primary" reason. Primary reasons are summarized in Table 20. Family was the dominant primary reason, receiving three times the frequency of citation as any other cause.

Table 20

What Was the Primary Reason for Changing Your Mind?

Primary Reason	% (N = 37)
Family	40.5
Job	13.5
School	13.5
Information	2.7
Money	2.7
Other	13.5

Note. The table total sums to less than 100% because "Primary Reason" was asked only if more than one reason had been given earlier.

Numerous ways were suggested for improving the call-up process. Timing and information adequacy were the dominant themes. Soldiers said the mission had come out of the blue, with no advance notice. They needed time to think about the implications of volunteering, details on mission requirements, and the opportunity to talk it over with family, friends, and other community members before making a decision. Once the decision was made to volunteer, they expressed a strong desire for timely feedback. They reported that once they had volunteered, they were given no specific dates for training and heard nothing about the mission except rumors. One rumor they heard repeatedly was that the mission had been scrubbed. In the absence of specific information, volunteers understandably went about their lives, starting new jobs, resuming or beginning educational commitments, becoming engaged, and making other personal and community commitments. By the time they received word that the mission was imminent, and that they had been selected for participation, it was inevitable that many of them would have to withdraw due to conflicting obligations.

## Changes in Readiness

A series of questions assessed unit readiness. The focus of these questions was on determining if changes had occurred in readiness levels since volunteers had left their units to participate in the PK mission, and if so, whether these changes had been caused by the PK mission. Senior leaders were asked to assess changes in readiness in the following areas: unit cohesion, family support, officer leadership capability, soldiers' ability to perform mission essential tasks, weapons qualification capability, and overall combat readiness. A subset of these questions was asked of junior leaders/soldiers. In all areas, respondents were asked to compare present conditions with those that had existed 6 months before soldiers departed for the PK mission.

If a change in readiness level had occurred, respondents were next asked to indicate whether the change was positive or negative. Then, using 5-pt rating scales, they indicated the magnitude of change (ranging from minor change = 1, to major change = 5) and the extent to which the PK mission had caused the change (ranging from not at all = 1, to totally = 5).

Unit cohesion. Senior leaders were asked if there had been a change in the willingness of their unit's members to work together as a cohesive team. Results are shown in Tables 21 and 22. The vast majority of senior leaders reported no changes in this area. The changes that were reported were predominantly positive, and increased slightly from Time 1 to Time 2. At both Times 1 and 2, positive changes varied with duty position, with higher levels of positive change reported by those closest to the troops.

Table 21

Has There Been A Change in Unit Cohesion?

Direction of Change	Sr. Leaders at Time 1 (%)	Sr. Leaders at Time 2 (%)
Positive Change	14.1	19.7
Negative Change	2.8	1.4
No Change	83.1	78.9

Table 22

## Perceived Positive Change In Unit Cohesion By Duty Position

Duty Position	Time 1 (%)	Time 2 (%)
NCOs	20.0	29.2
Co Cmdrs	16.0	17.4
Battalion	4.8	12.5
Total	14.1	19.7

The mean amount of positive change in unit cohesion, at both Times 1 and 2, was 3.1 on a 5-pt scale. Senior leaders who reported positive changes in unit cohesion were willing to attribute the change to the PK mission to a moderate extent. On a 5-pt scale of the extent to which the changes were caused by the PK mission, the mean at Time 1 was 2.5. At Time 2, the mean was 2.6.

Family support. This question asked senior leaders if there had been any change in the extent to which their units provided support for the families of its soldiers. A majority of 29th ID(L) senior leaders reported a positive change in family support at both Times 1 and 2 (see Tables 23 and 24). Table 24 suggests that awareness of positive impacts on family support may begin at battalion level and then “filter down” to company level. Senior leaders at battalion reported high levels of perceived positive change at both Time 1 and Time 2. Company commanders reported a substantial increase in family support from Time 1 to Time 2, and company NCOs remained constant in their evaluations at both measurement occasions.

Table 23

## Has There Been A Change in Family Support?

Direction of Change	Sr. Leaders at Time 1 (%)	Sr. Leaders at Time 2 (%)
Positive Change	52.1	60.6
Negative Change	1.4	1.4
No Change	46.5	38.0

The mean amount of positive change in family support was near the scale midpoint at both Time 1 (mean = 2.9) and Time 2 (mean = 3.0). Attributions of positive changes to the PK mission were substantial (above the scale midpoint) at both Times 1 and 2, and increased slightly across time. The mean causal attribution ratings (on a 5-pt scale) were 3.2 at Time 1 and 3.5 at Time 2.

Table 24

Perceived Positive Change In Family Support By Duty Position

Duty Position	Time 1 (%)	Time 2 (%)
NCOs	40.0	41.7
Co Cmdrs	48.0	65.2
Battalion	71.4	75.0
Total	52.1	60.6

Change in leadership capability. Both senior leaders and junior leaders/soldiers were asked if there had been a change in the ability of officers and NCOs to lead effectively (see Tables 25 and 26). More senior leaders reported positive than negative change in leadership capabilities, and positive change was reported increasingly across measurement occasions, especially at the battalion level. The mean amounts of positive change (on a 5-pt scale) were 3.6 at Time 1, and 3.3 at Time 2. The negative change mean ratings (on the same 5-pt scale) were 2.4 at Time 1 and 2.5 at Time 2.

Table 25

Has There Been A Change in Leadership Capability?

Direction of change	Sr. Leaders at Time 1 (%)	Sr. Leaders at Time 2 (%)	Soldiers at Time 1 (%)
Positive Change	12.7	18.3	11.7
Negative Change	7.0	5.6	10.7
No Change or Don't Know	80.3	76.0	77.6

Table 26

Perceived Positive Change In Leadership Capability By Duty Position

Duty Position	Time 1 (%)	Time 2 (%)
NCOs	12.0	12.5
Co Cmdrs	24.0	17.4
Battalion	0.0	25.0
Total	12.7	18.3

Although the majority of senior leaders reported no change in leadership capability, it is noteworthy that of those who reported a change, more thought the change had been positive than thought it had been negative. Those who reported a positive change also rated it as substantially higher in magnitude than those reporting a negative change. Mean attribution ratings (the extent to which observed changes could be attributed to the PK mission) were equal for those reporting positive and negative change: 3.2 on a 5-pt scale.

Approximately equal proportions of junior leaders/soldiers reported positive (12%) and negative (11%) changes in the leadership capabilities of their officers and NCOs. The mean amount of change reported by junior leaders/soldiers was equal for those reporting positive and negative impacts: 2.9 on a 5-pt scale. Mean attribution ratings also were comparable: 2.8 for those reporting a positive change and 2.6 for those reporting a negative change.

Ability to perform mission essential tasks (METs). Senior leaders were asked if there had been a change in the capabilities of soldiers in their units to perform METs. The ratio of senior leaders reporting positive versus negative impacts was approximately 2-to-1, at both Times 1 and 2 (see Table 27). Moreover, the amount of positive change was substantially greater than the amount of negative change (3.3 versus 2.0 at Time 1, and 3.0 versus 2.3 at Time 2). The Time 1 means differed significantly,  $F(1, 19) = 9.87, p < .01$ .

Although senior leaders were twice as likely to say that observed impacts on ability to perform METs were positive in direction, and also inclined to rate the amount of positive change as greater in magnitude than negative change, there was a tendency to attribute negative impacts to the PK mission to a greater degree. At Time 1, those who reported a negative impact on ability to perform METs were significantly more likely to attribute the change to the PK mission than were those who reported a positive impact. The mean negative attribution score was 4.4 on

a 5-pt scale, and the mean positive attribution score was 2.6. The difference between these means was significant,  $F(1, 19) = 13.21, p < .01$ . At Time 2, the difference was less extreme, with a mean negative attribution score of 3.3, and a mean positive attribution score of 2.5. The latter two means did not differ significantly ( $p > .05$ ).

Table 27

Has There Been A Change in Ability to Perform METs?

Direction of Change	Sr. Leaders at Time 1 (%)	Sr. Leaders at Time 2 (%)
Positive Change	19.7	15.5
Negative Change	9.9	8.5
No Change or Don't Know	70.4	76.0

**Weapons qualification.** Neither senior leaders nor junior leaders/soldiers perceived substantial change in weapons qualification capability. Ninety-two percent of senior leaders at Time 1 and 87% of senior leaders at Time 2 reported no change on this readiness dimension. Among those reporting a change, the ratio of positive-to-negative reports was approximately 2-to-1.

Junior leaders/soldiers also reported little impact in this area. Ninety percent reported no change, and the remaining 10% were equally divided between reports of positive and negative change.

**Combat readiness.** Impact of the PK mission on combat readiness was negative, although the negative impact lessened with time for most senior leaders (see Table 28). The proportion of negative combat readiness ratings varied across time as a function of duty position. Both company commanders and battalion-level senior leaders became less negative across measurement occasions, while company NCOs became more negative. In the junior leader/soldier survey, positive impacts on combat readiness were reported by 10.2% of junior leaders/soldiers, and negative impacts were reported by 23.5%.

Table 28

Has There Been A Change in Combat Readiness? (Source: Senior Leaders)

Duty Position	Positive (%)		Negative (%)		None/Dk (%)	
	Time 1	Time 2	Time 1	Time 2	Time 1	Time 2
NCOs	16.0	16.7	24.0	37.5	60.0	45.8
Co Cmdrs	12.0	13.0	40.0	21.7	48.0	65.2
Battalion	0.0	8.3	47.6	25.0	52.4	66.7
Total	9.9	12.7	36.5	28.2	53.5	59.1

Early in the mission the tendency to judge the impact of the PK mission as either positive, negative, or neutral was related to the percentage of the unit's troops lost to the PK mission. At Time 1, senior leaders who said that the mission produced a negative impact on combat readiness experienced the largest percentage of troop loss. Those saying the impact was positive had the smallest percentage troop loss, and senior leaders reporting no impact on combat readiness experienced an intermediate level of troop loss. This correspondence was statistically reliable at Time 1,  $F(2, 59) = 4.23, p < .05$ . (Eta squared = .1253.) A Newman-Keuls follow-up test indicated that the negative change mean was greater than either the positive change mean or the no change mean ( $p < .05$ ). The relationship between percentage of troop loss and combat readiness ratings did not occur at Time 2,  $F(2, 59) < 1, p > .05$ . The data on proportional troop loss at both measurement occasions are presented in Table 29. Figure 3 graphically illustrates the pattern at Time 1. Although the absolute difference between the highest and lowest means at Time 1 was not great, the largest mean troop loss (7.4%) was 72% greater than the smallest mean troop loss (4.3%). (Relative loss seems to have been the key.)

The mediating influence of percentage of troop loss upon judgments of combat readiness may partially explain the anomalous divergence, noted above, between decreasing negative judgments of company commanders and battalion senior leaders versus increasing negative judgments of company NCOs. As shown in Table 28, company NCOs became more negative over time in their judgments of the PK missions's impact upon combat readiness, whereas company commanders and battalion senior leaders became less negative. Troop loss may interact with the time dimension, becoming more aversive at the most direct level of troop contact. Although company commanders and battalion senior leaders can make administrative adjustments, company NCOs may find it progressively more difficult to adjust to the undeniable reality of fewer bodies.




Figure 3. The relationship between mean percentage of unit strength lost to the PK Mission and combat readiness impact ratings at Time 1

Table 29

The Association Between Percentage of Troop Loss and Combat Readiness Impact Ratings

Combat Readiness Impact Rating	%of Unit Strength Lost to the PK mission			
	Time 1		Time 2	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Positive Change	4.3	2.6	6.8	2.8
No Change	5.6	2.9	6.0	3.2
Negative Change	7.4	2.9	6.8	2.6

Although more senior leaders and junior leaders/soldiers reported negative than positive changes in combat readiness, those who reported positive changes rated them as more impactful. Table 30 summarizes mean ratings of the amount of observed changes, measured on a 5-pt scale,



Table 30

## Mean Ratings of the Extent of Change in Combat Readiness

Sr. Leaders				Jr. Leaders/Soldiers	
Time 1		Time 2		Time 1	
Positive (n = 7)	Negative (n = 26)	Positive (n = 9)	Negative (n = 20)	Positive (n = 20)	Negative (n = 46)
2.7	2.0	3.2	2.5	3.4	2.4
$F(1, 31) = 2.57, ns$		$F(1, 27) = 2.86, ns$		$F(1, 64) = 11.01, p < .01$	

where 1 = minor change and 5 = major change. The difference between positive and negative mean ratings was significant among junior leaders/soldiers, but not among senior leaders.

Senior leaders who reported negative changes, however, were more inclined to attribute the changes to the PK mission, although this tendency diminished somewhat across measurement occasions. At Time 1, mean attribution ratings (on a 5-pt scale) for negative and positive change were 3.5 and 2.1,  $F(1, 31) = 5.58, p < .05$ , respectively. At Time 2, negative and positive attribution ratings were 3.5 and 2.7,  $F(1, 27) = 2.10, p > .05$ , respectively. Among junior leaders/soldiers, the tendency for greater attribution of negative changes to the PK mission did not occur. Mean junior leader/soldier attribution ratings for positive and negative changes in combat readiness were 3.1 and 2.9. These means did not differ statistically ( $p > .05$ ).

**Results:**  
**Readiness Group Questionnaires**

Four out of 7 (57%) readiness advisors said that the PK mission had impacted 29th ID(L) training. This percentage is comparable to the percentage of 29th ID(L) senior leaders who reported a training impact (52% at Time 1 and 48% at Time 2). Also in common with the 29th ID(L) leadership, the advisors who said there had been an impact could not agree over its direction. Two advisors reported a positive training impact from the mission, and 2 others said the impact was negative. Regardless of its direction, however, the 4 advisors reporting an impact agreed that it was minor in magnitude. (All ratings were at or below the midpoint of a 5-pt rating scale.) They also agreed that the 29th ID(L) had done a good job of adjusting to the impact. (All ratings were at or above the midpoint of a 5-pt rating scale.)

Advisors were unanimous in reporting no need for any of the units to change either yearly training schedules or training standards due to the PK mission. Also, there was no reported need

for special training events and no instances of delayed training until new or additional trainers could be prepared. In a consistent vein, none of the advisors thought that 29th ID(L) soldiers had been required to work longer hours in order to support the PK mission.

Although the observations of readiness advisors mirrored those of 29th ID(L) leadership concerning training impacts of the PK mission, their evaluations differed substantially in the areas of unit readiness (unit cohesion, family support, leadership capability, MET performance, weapons qualification capability, and combat readiness). The predominant assessments made by the readiness advisors in these areas were "no change," or "don't know." In marked contrast with senior leaders' concern over possible negative impacts on combat readiness, no negative impact whatsoever was reported by any advisor in this area of functioning. And only scattered reports of positive impacts occurred. (In contrast, for example, to widespread belief among senior leaders that family support had been boosted substantially.) One advisor said units had become more cohesive, and attributed a majority of this change to the PK mission. Two advisors cited enhanced leadership capabilities among NCOs and officers and enhanced capabilities of soldiers to perform METs, but they gave the PK mission little credit for causing these changes.

Overall, AC readiness advisors reported negligible impacts of the PK mission, except in the area of training. Even the training impact, however, was unclear. Half the advisors who reported such an impact thought it was positive while the other half believed it was negative. Notwithstanding their downplaying of its effect, the advisors were keenly aware of the mission's existence, and strongly supported (by a vote of 6-to-1) the 29th ID(L)'s future participation in similar assignments.

#### Results:

#### 29th ID(L) Senior Leaders' Interviews

##### Senior Leaders' Post-Reassignment Interview Completion Rates

Interviews were completed with 65 of the 71 senior leaders (91.5%) who had completed both earlier questionnaires. These interviews were conducted approximately 90 days after the PK mission troops had been reassigned to their home units.

##### Senior Leaders' Post-Reassignment Interviews

In written comments on the two previously collected questionnaires, several senior leaders mentioned that, although they were currently feeling a personnel shortage due to the PK mission, they felt that participation in the mission would pay positive dividends in the long run because the volunteers would return as better soldiers. Accordingly, the first question asked of senior leaders in the post-reassignment interviews was whether volunteers had returned as better soldiers, about the same, or worse than before they left. The results (See Table 31) leave little room for doubt. Over 70% of senior leaders thought the PK mission volunteers had returned as better soldiers than before they left, and an overwhelming 93.9% thought they were either better

or the same as before they left. Only 3 out of 65 senior leaders thought the volunteers had returned as worse soldiers.

Table 31

Did the Volunteers Return As Better Soldiers, About the Same, Or Worse Than Before They Left?

Response	%
Better	70.8
About the same	23.1
Worse	4.6
Don't know	1.5

When senior leaders were asked if returning volunteers were better trained, about the same, or not trained as well as before they left, 72.7% replied that they were better trained. The remaining 27.7% said that the training status of returning volunteers was about the same as before they left. No senior leaders thought returning volunteers were worse trained than before they left.

The most serious issue to emerge from the senior leader questionnaire data was the concern with combat readiness. Senior leaders initially feared that loss of troops to the PK mission would attenuate their unit's combat readiness. This concern moderated somewhat during the course of the mission, but nevertheless persisted as a major issue. Early in the mission, 36.5% of senior leaders expressed concern that the mission was having a negative impact on combat readiness. Later in the mission, this figure had dropped to 28.2%. The mean amount of negative impact, as measured on a 5-pt scale where 1 = minor and 5 = major, was 2.0 at Time 1 and 2.5 at Time 2.

One of the central concerns during the post-reassignment interviews was in determining if there had been a commensurate positive impact on combat readiness following the return of the volunteers. To assess this, senior leaders were asked: "Did the return of the volunteers cause a change in the combat readiness of your unit?" (See Table 32.) No leader reported a negative change in combat readiness following the return of the volunteers. Of those who reported a positive change (35.4%), the mean amount of change was 3.09 on a 5-pt scale.

Senior leaders were also asked about morale among the returning volunteers. If these soldiers returned in a state of demoralization, their negative states could be expected to affect other troops over time. Conversely, if volunteers returned in a state of enhanced morale, this could positively affect other troops over time. Results from this question are summarized in

Table 33, where it can be seen that positive morale changes were reported approximately three times as often as negative morale changes. Almost 85% of senior leaders reported that PK mission volunteers returned with morale either improved or about the same as before they left.

Table 32

Did the Return of the Volunteers Cause a Change in the Combat Readiness of Your Unit?

Response	%
Positive Change in Combat Readiness	35.4
Negative Change in Combat Readiness	0.0
No Change in Combat Readiness	63.1
Don't know	1.5

Table 33

Would You Say Their Morale is Improved, About the Same, or Worse Than It Was Before They Left for the Mission?

Response	%
Morale is Improved	38.5
Morale is About the Same	46.2
Morale is Worse	13.8
Don't know	1.5

#### Summary and Discussion: Overview

One of the most unexpected findings of this investigation was the extent to which senior leaders' judgments of the PK mission's impact upon the 29th ID(L) changed substantially across time. This shift in perceived impact was manifest clearly in the area of training. At its inception, many senior leaders were suspicious of the training impact of the PK mission, perhaps concerned that it would siphon away scarce personnel resources. As the PK mission progressed, however, evaluations of training impact shifted from a decidedly negative stance to an overall positive stance. By the time the mission had concluded and volunteers had been reassigned to their units

within the 29th ID(L), moreover, 72.7% of senior leaders reported that the volunteers had returned as better trained soldiers than before they had left. And another 27.7% of senior leaders said the volunteers had returned at least as well trained as when they left. With the majority of volunteers returning as better trained soldiers, one can only surmise that positive benefits will redound to units of the 29th ID(L) as these individuals are fully integrated back into their units. And indeed, post-reassignment interviews with senior leaders lent support to the view that these positive benefits are occurring.

A similar shift in judged impact of the mission was evident in the area of combat readiness. Throughout the duration of the mission, senior leaders reported that the overall impact of the PK mission on combat readiness was negative, although the negative impact lessened with time. With the return of the volunteers at the conclusion of the mission, however, senior leaders reported a positive change in combat readiness. In order to assess the long-term impact of the PK mission on combat readiness, it is instructive to consider reported impacts, both positive and negative, at all three measurement occasions. Early in the mission, 36.5% of senior leaders reported the mission as having a negative impact on combat readiness. These negative sentiments were partially offset by another 9.9% of senior leaders who thought the mission was having a positive impact on combat readiness. When the positive and negative sentiments are combined, they produce a net effect of -26.6% (positive impact minus negative impact). Of course, the (net) negative effect wasn't quite this strong because a close examination of the results section above will reveal that mean positive impacts were (nonsignificantly) greater than mean negative impacts. We can safely say, nonetheless, that at the first measurement occasion there was a perceived overall negative impact, and the effect was large enough to be considered a problem.

The perception of a negative impact on combat readiness persisted at Time 2, but its magnitude had eroded substantially. Evaluations had shifted to 28.2% (negative) and 12.7% (positive), for a net effect of -15.5%. And at the third measurement occasion, which occurred approximately 90 days after the mission had concluded and volunteers had been reassigned to their 29th ID(L) units, 35.4% of senior leaders reported a positive impact on combat readiness and 0.0% reported a negative impact, for a net (positive) impact of +35.4%. Although both the phrasing of the question and the measurement methodology (a shift from questionnaires to interviews) changed between the second and third measurement occasions, and hence could have influenced the results somewhat, it is nonetheless evident that an evaluative shift occurred across time. Moreover, it is also evident that the shift took the form of an initially strong concern with a possible negative impact on combat readiness, which weakened across time, and eventually changed into a conviction that the ultimate impact on combat readiness was substantially positive. It seems that the short term effect on combat readiness was negative, but that the long term effect was positive.

Another important finding of this investigation was that senior leader judgments of positive, neutral, or negative impact, on both training and combat readiness, were mediated by the extent of troop loss to the PK mission. (Especially early in the mission.) Senior leaders who reported

negative impacts experienced relatively large percentage troop loss. Those reporting positive impacts experienced relatively small percentage troop loss.

The relationship between troop loss and judgments of impact on both training and combat readiness suggests that consideration should be given in future missions of this nature to selecting volunteers proportionally from all eligible units. With the PK mission, senior leaders of some units reported losing 1% of soldiers, whereas senior leaders in other units reported losing 12%. Not surprisingly, senior leaders with heavier losses had initially negative reactions. This also suggests that to the extent possible volunteers should be drawn from a broadly defined pool in order to minimize impact at the unit level.

In other areas, the PK mission produced strongly positive impacts, especially in morale and family support. A majority of senior leaders reported positive changes in family support at both measurement occasions during the mission. And both senior leaders and junior leaders/soldiers reported positive morale impact within units of the 29th ID(L) while the mission was in progress. According to senior leaders, moreover, volunteers returned from the Sinai with enhanced morale. Reports of positive morale impact were substantiated by the substantial percentages of both senior leaders and junior leaders/soldiers who indicated willingness to volunteer for a mission in the future. And regardless of whether they would personally volunteer for a future mission, virtually all senior leaders and readiness advisors, and over 90% of junior leaders/soldiers thought participation in the mission by the 29th ID(L) was a good idea and endorsed future participation in similar missions. The following comments, from an officer in the 29th ID(L), illustrates the overall positive evaluation which the mission enjoyed.

"I do not feel that the temporary loss of the PK mission soldiers had any impact on the type or quality of the unit's training during the past year. The positive impact on our combat readiness that I indicated in this survey, I feel, results from the psychological effect the PK mission has had on all of our soldiers. This was the first time that these Guardsmen have been given this opportunity to serve. Even for those that did not volunteer to go to the Sinai, there is a sense of pride that members of this unit and this division were called upon to perform a real world mission. This makes them feel more a part of the total Army, and makes them realize that with the downsizing of the military, there is an increased chance that they could be called to active service in defense of our national interests. Overall, I feel that this is a good mission for the Guard, and should be "finetuned" with lessons learned, and continued in the future."

## Summary and Discussion: Specific Areas of Impact

### Training Impact

The overall impact in this areas was judged to be mildly positive during the course of the mission, and substantially positive following the return of the volunteers. Senior leaders originally thought the training impact of the PK mission would be more negative than positive. Over the duration of the mission, however, their viewpoint changed to a mildly positive stance. By the time the volunteers were reassigned, senior leaders were predominantly positive.

Senior leader perceptions were related to the extent of troop loss to the mission. Senior leaders with heavy losses were more negative toward the mission. Junior leaders/soldiers were somewhat more positive than senior leaders in their judgments of mission impact on training. Readiness advisor judgments of training impact mirrored those of senior leaders.

Virtually all senior leaders were confident of their troops' ability to adapt to changing demands imposed by the PK mission. Readiness advisors also expressed confidence in unit ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Few senior leaders (and no readiness advisors) reported impacts in such areas as training plans, standards, and schedules.

Longer work hours were required of some senior leaders (approximately 15%) and junior leaders/soldiers (10%), in order to fill in for volunteers. This was a greater problem, according to written comments, when volunteers were full-time (AGR) personnel.

### Impact on Morale and Unit Cohesion

A third of junior leaders/soldiers and senior leaders reported an impact on morale, and for those reporting an impact, it was seen as predominantly positive in direction. Company commanders and platoon leaders were most likely to report positive morale impacts. Senior leaders also reported improved morale among returning volunteers.

### Recruitment

Both junior leaders/soldiers and senior leaders registered widespread dissatisfaction with how recruitment for the PK mission was conducted. Complaints focused on inadequate prior notice, insufficient information upon which to base a decision, and lack of feedback on the selection process, but encompassed a broad array of topics. Junior leaders/soldiers and senior leaders freely offered recommendations for improving the recruitment process (see Appendices E and F).

Additional insight into improving the recruitment process was obtained through interviewing soldiers who had initially volunteered but subsequently changed their minds about serving. Consistent with senior leader and junior leader/soldier comments, timing and information



inadequacy were the dominant criticisms from these soldiers. They recommended more advance notice, more complete information, the opportunity to talk the mission over with family and significant others before making a decision, and timely feedback on the selection process from the available pool of volunteers.

Lessons learned. Several lessons concerning the recruitment process can be drawn from the research. (1) Provide advance notice. Let potential volunteers know as far in advance as possible that a mission is forthcoming. (2) Provide complete details in advance, in writing, especially regarding dates, mission requirements, training, and availability of family support. Ensure that the same information is provided to everybody. Standardize the information dissemination process. (3) As part of information dissemination, have previous mission volunteers conduct briefings. If possible, these briefings should be conducted by soldiers of the same rank and educational levels as those being recruited, in order to enhance rapport and optimize credibility and communication effectiveness. (4) Give soldiers the opportunity to talk it over with family and significant others. It is imperative that family and significant others be part of the decision process. Sixty-percent of soldiers who initially volunteered but subsequently withdrew cited either "family" or "significant others" as reasons for changing their minds about the mission. (5) Develop a schedule and stick to it. If schedule changes cannot be avoided, immediately communicate the details to volunteers. (6) Make the selection criteria clear to all potential volunteers. (7) Provide timely feedback on the results of the selection process, well in advance of the date for commencement of train up. In the present instance, soldiers were left in limbo for months, with no reliable information whatsoever, and uncertainty as to whether the mission was still planned. (8) Strive for consistency in administration of the call-up process. In the "No Show" interviews, some soldiers claimed they had never volunteered in the first place, although they were placed on volunteer rosters. Four soldiers listed as volunteers who had changed their minds were subsequently reported to actually be serving in the Sinai. Other soldiers on the No Show list confirmed that they had indeed volunteered, but denied that they had ever changed their minds about going. They insisted they were still eager to go and had never been told why they had not been selected. Some volunteers who were not selected for participation in the mission thought they had been unfairly rejected, and some of them were clearly embittered about the rejection.

In spite of dissatisfaction with the recruitment process, a sizeable proportion of both junior leaders/soldiers and senior leaders indicated a willingness to volunteer for future PK missions. Moreover, there was near-universal endorsement for 29th ID(L) participation in such missions, from both members of the 29th as well as from AC readiness advisors.

#### Impact on Family Support

Impact in this area was viewed as highly positive. A majority of senior leaders reported a positive impact in this important area of unit functioning. Amount of reported change was substantial, averaging around the midpoint on a 5-pt scale ranging from "minor" to "major." Willingness to attribute the change specifically to the PK mission was high.



### Impact on Leadership Capability

The slight impact in this area was positive.

### Ability to Perform METs

The slight impact in this area was positive.

### Combat Readiness

Combat readiness was the only area where persistent and substantial negative impacts were reported throughout the duration of the mission. Combat readiness judgments, however, appeared to be mediated by extent of troop loss, especially early in the mission, when negative sentiments were most prevalent. Senior leaders rendering negative impact evaluations experienced relatively large percentage troop losses to the mission.

Across the duration of the mission, negative reactions moderated substantially, and by the conclusion of the PK mission, after volunteers had been reassigned to their 29th ID(L) units, over a third of senior leaders reported positive impacts upon combat readiness, while no senior leaders reported negative impacts. It appears, therefore, that the overall long term impact of the PK mission was positive in the area of combat readiness. This conclusion is consistent with the judgments of over 70% of senior leaders that returning volunteers were better trained than before they left. Indeed, the most informative statistic of this investigation may be that in the opinion of 70.8% of senior leaders, returning volunteers were "better soldiers" than before they left.

### Recommendations

- ▶ Improve the recruitment process. Considerable dissatisfaction was expressed concerning how the recruitment process was conducted. Criticism was not restricted to soldiers who volunteered and then changed their minds. Both senior leaders and junior leaders/soldiers in the 29th ID(L) also expressed strong beliefs that the process was poorly managed. It is not possible to determine if hard feelings will linger and negatively influence future recruitments that might occur, but it is imperative in future recruitments to avoid the mistakes that characterized the current effort. For specific comments and recommendations refer to the sections on "Improving the Recruitment Process" in the main body of this report and to junior leader/soldier and senior leader comments in Appendices E and F. For a listing of specific lessons learned, see the "Lessons Learned" paragraph under the "Recruitment" section in the discussion section above.
- ▶ Monitor the proportion of volunteers recruited from each unit in order to limit and possibly avoid disproportionate impact. Substantial negative impact of the PK mission was observed only in the area of combat readiness, and these perceived negative impacts were associated with high proportions of troop loss. Although negative combat readiness impacts seemed to

self-rectify somewhat across the duration of the mission, they may be avoidable entirely by implementing strict limitations on the percentage of troops taken from any unit.

- ▶ Distinguish between short-term and long-term impacts. When planning future evaluations of experimental interventions such as the PK mission, it is important to recall that perceived impacts can vary considerably depending upon when measurements are taken. If the present evaluation had been based solely on data from the first measurement occasion, a very different set of conclusions regarding training and combat readiness impacts would have resulted. As it was, utilizing three measurement occasions, it was possible to observe an initial (and substantial) perception of negative impact, followed by a lessening of the degree of perceived negativity across the duration of the project, and concluding with net positive impacts upon both training and combat readiness following the return of the (better trained and motivated) volunteers.
- ▶ Recruit from the largest practicable volunteer pool in order to spread the impact of troop loss and minimize the potential impact on individual units. Administratively, this is probably a difficult recommendation to implement because a broadened volunteer pool entails substantially incremented coordination efforts. It should be recognized, however, that volunteer assignments, such as the PK mission, have the potential of delivering tremendous psychological benefits to participating units. Senior leaders in the 29th ID(L) convincingly stated that the mere opportunity to participate in the PK mission produced a huge psychological boost for the personnel in their units. It inspired renewed pride in their units, and pride in the ARNG as an entity capable of making significant “real-world” contributions to world peace. It gave ARNG soldiers a significantly enhanced feeling of being a mainstream participant in the defense of our national interests. And that kind of esprit de corps is worth an extra administrative effort.
- ▶ Continue excellent work in family support and other areas with positive impact. One of these areas was morale. Evidence from all points in time and from every source (junior leaders/soldiers as well as senior leaders) indicated that the PK mission resulted in substantial morale boosts. And these morale changes were reported not only for participating volunteers, but also for 29th ID(L) soldiers who did not participate. It is to be hoped that these positive morale changes can be built upon and expanded through future ARNG volunteer missions. Support for future participation in similar missions was near unanimous among both senior leaders and junior leaders/soldiers of the 29th ID(L), and support for future participation was almost as strong (86%) among AC readiness advisors. Clearly, the PK mission struck a responsive chord among 29th ID(L) personnel. It was an idea whose time had come, and the soldiers of the 29th ID(L) rose to the occasion.

APPENDIX A

Senior Leadership Questionnaire  
(Wave 1)

**29th Infantry Division (Light)  
Company and Battalion  
Senior Leadership Questionnaire**

**Confidentiality Notification**

This notification is to inform you of who is conducting this survey and what use will be made of the information being collected, in accordance with Public Law 93-573, the Privacy Act of 1974. Development and fielding of the survey is the responsibility of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Its purpose is to determine any impact on 29th Division personnel, readiness, and/or training resulting from participation in the Multinational Force and Observers peacekeeping mission in the Sinai. This research is authorized by Acts of Congress to support the maintenance of military forces. Specific authority can be found in 10 United States Code, Section 3013. The use of social security numbers is authorized by Executive Order 9397.

29th Infantry Division (Light)  
Company and Battalion  
Senior Leadership Questionnaire

**General Instructions**

The purpose of this questionnaire is to determine what personnel, readiness, and training impact, if any, the 29th ID(L) is experiencing as a result of providing soldiers for the Sinai peacekeeping (PK) mission. You have been identified as uniquely qualified to help make this determination. If you don't know the answer to a question, mark the Don't Know (DK) space and go on to the next item. If the question does not apply to you, mark the Not Applicable (NA) space and go on to the next item. Use the back of the sheet if your answers require additional space.

1. Name \_\_\_\_\_ 2. Soc Sec # \_\_\_\_\_
3. Company \_\_\_\_\_ 4. Battalion \_\_\_\_\_
5. What is your current duty assignment: \_\_\_\_\_
6. What is the highest grade or level in school that you have completed?  
(Check only one.)
- ☐ a) Some high school, but no diploma
  - ☐ b) GED or other high school equivalency certificate
  - ☐ c) High school diploma
  - ☐ d) 1 or 2 years of college, but no degree
  - ☐ e) Associate's degree--occupational program
  - ☐ f) Associate's degree--academic program
  - ☐ g) 3 or 4 years of college, but no degree
  - ☐ h) Bachelor's degree
  - ☐ i) A year or more of graduate credit, but no graduate degree
  - ☐ j) Graduate or professional degree

7. What additional education do you eventually expect to acquire? (Check only one.)

- ☐ a) None
- ☐ b) Just take courses--no degree
- ☐ c) High school diploma
- ☐ d) GED or other high school equivalency certificate
- ☐ e) Vocational/technical certificate or license
- ☐ f) Associate's degree
- ☐ g) Bachelor's degree
- ☐ h) Master's degree
- ☐ i) Doctorate degree
- ☐ j) Professional degree (M.D., J.D., etc.)

8. Do you plan to take courses for credit during the next year?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ Don't know

9. How many years and months of active duty service have you completed?

\_\_\_\_\_ Years and \_\_\_\_\_ Months

10. How many years and months of National Guard service have you completed?

\_\_\_\_\_ Years and \_\_\_\_\_ Months

11. How many years and months have you been in your current unit, that is, the unit you named in Questions 3 and 4 above?

\_\_\_\_\_ Years and \_\_\_\_\_ Months

12. What is your present grade/rank?

	WARRANT	
ENLISTED	OFFICERS	OFFICERS
<input type="checkbox"/> E5/SGT	<input type="checkbox"/> WO1	<input type="checkbox"/> O1/2LT
<input type="checkbox"/> E6/SSG	<input type="checkbox"/> CW2	<input type="checkbox"/> O2/1LT
<input type="checkbox"/> E7/SFC	<input type="checkbox"/> CW3	<input type="checkbox"/> O3/CPT
<input type="checkbox"/> E8/MSG-1SG	<input type="checkbox"/> CW4	<input type="checkbox"/> O4/MAJ
<input type="checkbox"/> E9/SGM-CSM	<input type="checkbox"/> CW5	<input type="checkbox"/> O5/LTC

### Personnel Impact

13. How many soldiers have left your unit to participate in the PK mission?

\_\_\_\_\_  
(If zero, skip to Q.18)

14. Approximately what percentage of total unit strength does the above number represent? \_\_\_\_\_%

15. How many of the soldiers above were: \_\_\_\_\_ E1-E4? \_\_\_\_\_ NCOs? \_\_\_\_\_ Officers?

16. How many of the soldiers who left for the PK mission have been temporarily replaced? \_\_\_\_\_ E1-E4? \_\_\_\_\_ NCOs? \_\_\_\_\_ Officers?

17. Did replacement soldiers require additional training in order to maintain unit efficiency? \_\_\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ DK \_\_\_\_\_ NA

### Training Impact

18. Overall, how has training in your unit been impacted by the PK mission?

- \_\_\_ Positive impact
- \_\_\_ Negative impact
- \_\_\_ No impact (Skip to Q.24)
- \_\_\_ DK (Skip to Q.24)

18a. How great was the impact on training? (Circle one)

Minor Impact					Major Impact
1	2	3	4	5	

18b. To what extent has your unit been able to adjust to the impact on training?

Not At All				Totally
1	2	3	4	5

19. Has your unit had to change its yearly training plan or any training schedules due to the PK mission?

\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No (Skip to Q.20) \_\_\_\_\_ DK (Skip to Q.20)

19a. If yes, what changes in training plans or schedules have been made?

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20. Have training standards changed as a result of the PK mission?

\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No (Skip to Q.21) \_\_\_\_\_ DK (Skip to Q.21)

20a. If yes, what changes in standards have been made? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

21. Has there been more need for special training events (e.g., Lanes Training)?

\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ DK \_\_\_ NA

22. Has critical training been delayed until new/additional trainers become prepared?

\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ DK \_\_\_ NA

23. In what other ways has it been necessary for your unit to modify its training because of the PK mission?

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

### **Morale**

24. Have your soldiers expressed comments about the PK mission?

\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No (Skip to Q.25) \_\_\_ DK (Skip to Q.25)

24a. What positive comments have you heard? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

24b. What negative comments have you heard? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

25. Have your soldiers been required to work longer hours as a result of the PK mission?

\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_ No (Skip to Q.26) \_\_\_ DK (Skip to Q.26)

25a. If yes, why have longer work hours been required?

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26. Have you personally found it necessary to work longer hours as a result of the PK mission?

☐ Yes ☐ No (Skip to Q.27)

26a. If yes, how many more hours each week, on average, have you had to work as a result of the PK mission?  Hours

26b. Why have longer work hours been necessary for you?

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27. Have you or any of your soldiers been impacted by the departure of the PK volunteers in any of the following ways? (Check all that apply.)

	Yourself	Your soldiers
Promotion opportunities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Assumption of additional duties	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Receipt of additional training	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please specify below)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

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28. Has the general level of morale changed in your unit as a result of the PK mission?

- ☐ Positive change
- ☐ Negative change
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.29)
- ☐ DK (Skip to Q.29)

28a. How great was the change in morale?

Minor Change			Major Change	
1	2	3	4	5



28b. Taking everything into consideration, how disruptive has the assignment of soldiers to the PK mission been to your unit?

Not Disruptive			Very Disruptive		
At All					
1	2	3	4	5	

### Volunteering for the Sinai PK Mission

29. Would you like to see the 29th ID(L) participate in more assignments like the PK mission?

☐ Yes ☐ No

30. Have you ever been to the Sinai on a peacekeeping deployment?

☐ Yes ☐ No

31. Did you volunteer for the current PK mission?

☐ Yes ☐ No (Skip to Q.35)

32. Please use the scale below to rate how important EACH of the following was to you when you decided to volunteer for the Sinai peacekeeping mission. Circle the number that applies using the scale below.

#### Scale

1 = Very unimportant  
2 = Unimportant  
3 = Neither unimportant  
nor important  
4 = Important  
5 = Very important  
6 = Not applicable

- a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Earning points towards retirement benefits
- b) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Medical benefits
- c) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Dental benefits
- d) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Montgomery G.I. Bill benefits
- e) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Challenging work/Learn new skills/Improve old skills
- f) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Military career advancement/Promotion
- g) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Serve country/Serve Army
- h) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Adventure/Travel/See the world/Learn about other cultures
- i) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Educational course credit/Credit towards degree

- j) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Needed more money
- k) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Was unemployed
- l) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Take some time out from school/job
- m) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Family pressures/problems
- n) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Wanted to get away from a bad neighborhood
- o) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Other (please specify): \_\_\_\_\_
- 

33. Did you volunteer for the Sinai deployment and then withdraw?

\_\_\_ Yes      \_\_\_ No (Skip to Q.36)

34. What were your reasons for withdrawing from the Sinai deployment? (After answering this question, please skip to Q.36)

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35. Please use the scale below to rate how important EACH of the following was to you when you decided NOT to volunteer for the Sinai peacekeeping mission. Circle the number that applies using the scale below.

**Scale**

- 1 = Very unimportant  
2 = Unimportant  
3 = Neither unimportant  
nor important  
4 = Important  
5 = Very important  
6 = Not applicable

- a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Didn't want to lose civilian job benefits
- b) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Couldn't afford financial loss
- c) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Couldn't leave civilian job
- d) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Spouse (important girlfriend/boyfriend) needs me here
- e) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Children need me here
- f) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Other family members need me here
- g) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Didn't want to interrupt education

h) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Other (please specify):

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36. Would you volunteer for a future PK mission?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Undecided

37. Were the soldiers in your unit provided with sufficient information from which to make informed decisions about volunteering for the PK mission?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ DK

38. Was the information they received accurate?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ DK ☐ NA

39. In what ways could recruitment for the PK mission have been improved?

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### **Troop Return**

40. Have you been briefed on how PK soldiers will be integrated back into their units?

☐ Yes ☐ No

41. Do you anticipate any significant problems following the return of the PK soldiers?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ DK

41a. If yes, what problems do you anticipate?\_\_\_\_\_

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### Readiness

The following section is concerned with unit readiness. Our interest is not in the level of readiness of your unit, but in whether there has been a **change** in readiness level since soldiers left your unit to participate in the PK mission, and whether these changes (if there were any) can be attributed to the PK mission. As you are well aware, unit readiness can be measured in a number of different areas. Each series of questions in this section is concerned with a different area of readiness.

In each readiness area, in order to judge if there has been a change, please compare your unit's readiness today with its readiness level in the **six months** before soldiers departed for the PK mission.

42. Has there been a change in the willingness of your unit's members to work together effectively as a cohesive team?

- ☐ Positive change (unit currently shows more teamwork)
- ☐ Negative change (unit currently shows less teamwork)
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.43)
- ☐ DK (Skip to Q.43)
- ☐ NA: I was not in this unit for the six months before soldiers departed (Skip to Q.43)

42a. How much change in teamwork has occurred?

Minor Change					Major Change	
1	2	3	4	5		

42b. To what extent can the change be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All					Totally	
1	2	3	4	5		

43. Has there been any change in the extent to which your unit provides support for the families of its soldiers?

- ☐ Positive change (more support)
- ☐ Negative change (less support)
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.44)
- ☐ DK (Skip to Q.44)
- ☐ NA (Skip to Q.44)

43a. How much change in support has occurred?

Minor Change					Major Change	
1	2	3	4	5		

43b. To what extent can the change in support be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All					Totally	
1	2	3	4	5		

44. Has there been a change in the capability of officers and NCOs to lead your unit?

- ☐ Positive change (increased capability)
- ☐ Negative change (decreased capability)
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.45)
- ☐ DK (Skip to Q.45)

44a. How much change in leadership capability has occurred?

Minor Change			Major Change	
1	2	3	4	5

44b. To what extent can the change in leadership capability be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All			Totally	
1	2	3	4	5

45. Has there been a change in the capabilities of soldiers in your unit to perform mission essential tasks?

- ☐ Positive change (increased capabilities)
- ☐ Negative change (decreased capabilities)
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.46)
- ☐ DK (Skip to Q.46)

45a. How much change in mission essential task performance capabilities has occurred?

Minor Change			Major Change	
1	2	3	4	5

45b. To what extent can the change be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All			Totally	
1	2	3	4	5

46. Has there been a change in your unit's capability to qualify on its weapons?

- ☐ Positive change (increased capability)
- ☐ Negative change (decreased capability)
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.47)
- ☐ DK (Skip to Q.47)

46a. How much change on weapons qualification capability has occurred?

Minor Change			Major Change	
1	2	3	4	5

46b. To what extent can the change be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All				Totally
1	2	3	4	5

47. Has there been a change in your unit's overall combat readiness?

- ☐ Positive change (increased readiness)
- ☐ Negative change (decreased readiness)
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.48)
- ☐ DK (Skip to Q.48)

47a. How much change in combat readiness has occurred?

Minor Change				Major Change
1	2	3	4	5

47b. To what extent can the change be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All				Totally
1	2	3	4	5

This section concerns **Army Organization**  
and your views of **Life in the Military**

48. Please use the scale below to indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. The term "military" in each question refers to the Army National Guard (ARNG). For each statement, circle the number that applies.

**Scale**

- 1 = strongly disagree
- 2 = disagree
- 3 = neither agree nor disagree
- 4 = agree
- 5 = strongly agree

- a) 1 2 3 4 5 I really feel as if the problems of the military are my own.
- b) 1 2 3 4 5 One of the major reasons I may stay in the military is that another organization may not match the overall benefits I have.
- c) 1 2 3 4 5 I feel like "part of the family" in the military.
- d) 1 2 3 4 5 I feel that I have too few options to consider leaving the military.
- e) 1 2 3 4 5 The military has a great deal of personal meaning for me.
- f) 1 2 3 4 5 It would be too costly for me to leave the military in the near future.
- g) 1 2 3 4 5 I am afraid of what might happen if I quit the military without having another job lined up.
- h) 1 2 3 4 5 It would be very hard for me to leave the military now even if I wanted to.
- i) 1 2 3 4 5 Too much of my life would be disrupted if I decided I wanted to leave the military now.
- j) 1 2 3 4 5 I feel a strong sense of belonging to the military.
- k) 1 2 3 4 5 Right now, staying with the military is a matter of necessity as much as desire.
- l) 1 2 3 4 5 I feel "emotionally attached" to the military.
- m) 1 2 3 4 5 One of the negative consequences of leaving the military would be the scarcity of available alternatives.

**Scale**

1 = strongly disagree  
2 = disagree  
3 = neither agree nor disagree  
4 = agree  
5 = strongly agree

- n) 1 2 3 4 5 I think I could easily become as attached to another organization as I am to the military.
- o) 1 2 3 4 5 I enjoy discussing the military with people outside it.

This section concerns  
**Marital Status and Dependents**

49. What is your current marital status? (Check only one.)

- ☐ a) Single and never married  
☐ b) Married for the first time  
☐ c) Remarried -- was divorced or widowed  
☐ d) Separated due to marital problems but no legal action taken  
☐ e) Legally separated or filing for divorce  
☐ f) Divorced  
☐ g) Widowed

50. Are you engaged, or is there an important girlfriend in your life right now?

☐ Yes ☐ No

In the following section, dependent children are defined as unmarried children who depend on you for over half their support. This includes adopted children and stepchildren. A dependent child must also be in one of the following categories:

Not yet 21, or  
Attends college and not yet 23 years old, or  
Has a mental or physical handicap



51. As defined above, how many dependent children do you have?

- |                                |                                      |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> None  | <input type="checkbox"/> Four        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> One   | <input type="checkbox"/> Five        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Two   | <input type="checkbox"/> Six or more |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Three |                                      |

52. How many dependent children live with you?

- |                                |                                      |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> None  | <input type="checkbox"/> Four        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> One   | <input type="checkbox"/> Five        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Two   | <input type="checkbox"/> Six or more |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Three |                                      |

53. Other than dependent children, how many people (such as parents or siblings) count on you to provide 75% or more of their financial support?

- |                                |                                      |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> None  | <input type="checkbox"/> Four        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> One   | <input type="checkbox"/> Five        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Two   | <input type="checkbox"/> Six or more |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Three |                                      |

<p>This section concerns <b>Jobs/careers</b></p>
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54. Which of the following applies to you? (Check all that apply.)

- ☐ a) Employed in an Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) job.
- ☐ b) Employed in full-time (35 hours or more per week) civilian job
- ☐ c) Employed in part-time (less than 35 hours per week) civilian job
- ☐ d) Unemployed, looking for work
- ☐ e) Unemployed, not looking for work
- ☐ f) Attending college
- ☐ g) Attending trade/vocational school
- ☐ h) Not in school
- ☐ i) Other (please specify): \_\_\_\_\_

55. If you have one now, what is your civilian job?

Job: \_\_\_\_\_

Title: \_\_\_\_\_

If no civilian job, check here and skip to Q.58: ☐

56. How easy or difficult would it have been for you to return to your former civilian job if you had gone on the Sinai deployment?

- ☐ Very easy
- ☐ Easy
- ☐ Neither easy nor difficult
- ☐ Difficult
- ☐ Very difficult
- ☐ Don't know

57. All in all, I am satisfied with my civilian job.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Neither disagree nor agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

58. All in all, I am satisfied with my military job.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Neither disagree nor agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

59. Which of the following best describes your career in the military or your current intentions for such a career? The term "military" in each statement refers to the ARNG.

- ☐ I have been in the military for 20 or more creditable years.
- ☐ I plan to stay in the military beyond 20 years.
- ☐ I plan to stay in the military until retirement at 20 years.
- ☐ I am undecided about staying in the military until retirement
- ☐ I will probably leave the military before retirement.
- ☐ I will definitely leave the military before retirement.

60. When do you expect to leave the ARNG?

\_\_\_\_\_ Month \_\_\_\_\_ Year

61. In 1994, how much money (gross) did you make working for the ARNG?

\$\_\_\_\_\_ (To the nearest \$1,000)

62. In 1994, how much money (gross) did you make working in your civilian job(s)?

\$\_\_\_\_\_ (To the nearest \$1,000)

☐ NA: I did not have any civilian job(s)

63. In 1994, how much money (gross) did your spouse earn from civilian and/or military job(s) or from her/his own business?

\$\_\_\_\_\_ (To the nearest \$1,000)

\_\_\_ NA: I did not have a spouse, or he/she does not work

64. How supportive is your spouse (or important girlfriend) of your being in the ARNG?

\_\_\_ Very unsupportive

\_\_\_ Unsupportive

\_\_\_ Neither unsupportive nor supportive

\_\_\_ Supportive

\_\_\_ Very supportive

\_\_\_ NA: I do not have a spouse (or important girlfriend).

65. How would you describe your marriage (or important relationship) **at the present time?**

\_\_\_ Very unhappy

\_\_\_ Unhappy

\_\_\_ Neither unhappy nor happy

\_\_\_ Happy

\_\_\_ Very happy

\_\_\_ NA: I do not have a spouse (or important girlfriend).

66. Please use the space below to make comments on this survey or on your participation in the ARNG. If you refer to a particular question, please note its number. Use the back of this page if additional space is needed.

**Thank you for your cooperation.** Please return the completed questionnaire in the enclosed postage-paid envelope.

APPENDIX B

Senior Leadership Questionnaire  
(Wave 2)

**29th Infantry Division (Light)  
Company and Battalion  
Senior Leadership Questionnaire**

Version 2, 95 May

**Confidentiality Notification**

This notification is to inform you of who is conducting this survey and what use will be made of the information being collected, in accordance with Public Law 93-573, the Privacy Act of 1974. This survey was compiled and is being administered by personnel of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, in Alexandria, Virginia, as part of a research project on peacekeeping operations. This research is authorized by acts of Congress which authorize recruitment and maintenance of military forces and authorizes research to accomplish this goal. This authority is in 10 United States Code, Section 3033. The use of Social Security numbers is authorized by Executive Order 9397. Survey participation is voluntary. Information on individuals is confidential and will not be used by nor released to anyone. Information on groups of soldiers will be used only for research and policy analysis.

**29th Infantry Division (Light)**  
**Company and Battalion**  
**Senior Leadership Questionnaire**

**General Instructions**

The purpose of this questionnaire is to determine what personnel, readiness, and training impact, if any, the 29th ID(L) is experiencing as a result of providing soldiers for the Sinai peacekeeping (PK) mission. You have been identified as uniquely qualified to help make this determination. If you don't know the answer to a question, mark the Don't Know (DK) space and go on to the next item. If the question does not apply to you, mark the Not Applicable (NA) space and go on to the next item. Use the back of the sheet if your answers require additional space.

1. Name \_\_\_\_\_ 2. Soc Sec # \_\_\_\_\_
3. Company \_\_\_\_\_ 4. Battalion \_\_\_\_\_
5. What is your current duty assignment: \_\_\_\_\_
6. How many years and months have you been in your current unit, that is, the unit you named in Questions 3 and 4 above?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Years and \_\_\_\_\_ Months
7. What is your present grade/rank?

ENLISTED	WARRANT	OFFICERS
OFFICERS		
___ E5/SGT	___ WO1	___ O1/2LT
___ E6/SSG	___ CW2	___ O2/1LT
___ E7/SFC	___ CW3	___ O3/CPT
___ E8/MSG-1SG	___ CW4	___ O4/MAJ
___ E9/SGM-CSM	___ CW5	___ O5/LTC

## Training Impact

8. Overall, how has training in your unit been impacted by the PK mission?

- ☐ Positive impact
- ☐ Negative impact
- ☐ No impact (Skip to Q.14)
- ☐ DK (Skip to Q.14)

8a. How great was the impact on training? (Circle one)

Minor Impact					Major Impact	
1	2	3	4	5		

8b. To what extent has your unit been able to adjust to the impact on training?

Not At All					Totally	
1	2	3	4	5		

9. Has your unit had to change its yearly training plan or any training schedules due to the PK mission?

☐ Yes      ☐ No (Skip to Q.14)      ☐ DK (Skip to Q.14)

9a. If yes, what changes in training plans or schedules have been made?

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10. Have training standards changed as a result of the PK mission?

☐ Yes      ☐ No (Skip to Q.14)      ☐ DK (Skip to Q.14)

10a. If yes, what changes in standards have been made? \_\_\_\_\_

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11. Has there been more need for special training events (e.g., Lanes Training)?

☐ Yes      ☐ No      ☐ DK      ☐ NA

12. Has critical training been delayed until new/additional trainers become prepared?

☐ Yes      ☐ No      ☐ DK      ☐ NA

13. In what other ways has it been necessary for your unit to modify its training because of the PK mission?

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### **Morale**

14. Have your soldiers expressed comments about the PK mission?

☐ Yes      ☐ No (Skip to Q.15)      ☐ DK (Skip to Q.15)

14a. What positive comments have you heard? \_\_\_\_\_

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14b. What negative comments have you heard? \_\_\_\_\_

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15. Have your soldiers been required to work longer hours as a result of the PK mission?

☐ Yes      ☐ No (Skip to Q.16)      ☐ DK (Skip to Q.16)

15a. If yes, why have longer work hours been required?

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16. Have you personally found it necessary to work longer hours as a result of the PK mission?

☐ Yes      ☐ No (Skip to Q.17)

16a. If yes, how many more hours each week, on average, have you had to work as a result of the PK mission? \_\_\_\_\_ Hours

16b. Why have longer work hours been necessary for you? \_\_\_\_\_

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17. Has the general level of morale changed in your unit as a result of the PK mission?

- ☐ Positive change
- ☐ Negative change
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.18)
- ☐ DK (Skip to Q.18)

17a. How great was the change in morale?

Minor Change					Major Change	
1	2	3	4		5	

17b. Taking everything into consideration, how disruptive has the assignment of soldiers to the PK mission been to your unit?

Not Disruptive			Very		
At All			Disruptive		
1	2	3	4		5

### **Volunteering for the Sinai PK Mission**

18. Would you like to see the 29th ID(L) participate in more assignments like the PK mission?

☐ Yes      ☐ No

19. Would you volunteer for a future PK mission?

☐ Yes      ☐ No      ☐ Undecided

### **Troop Return**

20. Have you been briefed on how PK soldiers will be integrated back into their units?

☐ Yes      ☐ No

21. Do you anticipate any significant problems following the return of the PK soldiers?

☐ Yes      ☐ No      ☐ DK

21a. If yes, what problems do you anticipate? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

### Readiness

The following section is concerned with unit readiness. Our interest is not in the level of readiness of your unit, but in whether there has been a **change** in readiness level since soldiers left your unit to participate in the PK mission, and whether these changes (if there were any) can be attributed to the PK mission. As you are well aware, unit readiness can be measured in a number of different areas. Each series of questions in this section is concerned with a different area of readiness.

In each readiness area, in order to judge if there has been a change, please compare your unit's readiness today with its readiness level in the **six months** before soldiers departed for the PK mission.

22. Has there been a change in the willingness of your unit's members to work together effectively as a cohesive team?

- ☐ Positive change (unit currently shows more teamwork)
- ☐ Negative change (unit currently shows less teamwork)
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.23)
- ☐ DK (Skip to Q.23)
- ☐ NA: I was not in this unit for the six months before soldiers departed (Skip to Q.23)

22a. How much change in teamwork has occurred?

Minor Change					Major Change	
1	2	3	4	5		

22b. To what extent can the change be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All			Totally	
1	2	3	4	5

23. Has there been any change in the extent to which your unit provides support for the families of its soldiers?

- ☐ Positive change (more support)
- ☐ Negative change (less support)
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.24)
- ☐ DK (Skip to Q.24)
- ☐ NA (Skip to Q.24)

23a. How much change in support has occurred?

Minor Change					Major Change	
1	2	3	4	5		

23b. To what extent can the change in support be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All			Totally	
1	2	3	4	5

24. Has there been a change in the capability of officers and NCOs to lead your unit?

- ☐ Positive change (increased capability)
- ☐ Negative change (decreased capability)
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.25)
- ☐ DK (Skip to Q.25)

24a. How much change in leadership capability has occurred?

Minor Change					Major Change	
1	2	3	4	5		

24b. To what extent can the change in leadership capability be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All					Totally	
1	2	3	4	5		

25. Has there been a change in the capabilities of soldiers in your unit to perform mission essential tasks?

- ☐ Positive change (increased capabilities)
- ☐ Negative change (decreased capabilities)
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.26)
- ☐ DK (Skip to Q.26)

25a. How much change in mission essential task performance capabilities has occurred?

Minor Change					Major Change	
1	2	3	4	5		

25b. To what extent can the change be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All					Totally	
1	2	3	4	5		

26. Has there been a change in your unit's capability to qualify on its weapons?

- ☐ Positive change (increased capability)
- ☐ Negative change (decreased capability)
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.27)
- ☐ DK (Skip to Q.27)

26a. How much change on weapons qualification capability has occurred?

Minor Change			Major Change	
1	2	3	4	5

26b. To what extent can the change be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All			Totally	
1	2	3	4	5

27. Has there been a change in your unit's overall combat readiness?

- ☐ Positive change (increased readiness)
- ☐ Negative change (decreased readiness)
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.28)
- ☐ DK (Skip to Q.28)

27a. How much change in combat readiness has occurred?

Minor Change			Major Change	
1	2	3	4	5

27b. To what extent can the change be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All			Totally	
1	2	3	4	5

This question concerns  
**Jobs/careers**

28. Which of the following applies to you? (Check all that apply.)

- ☐ a) Employed in an Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) job.
- ☐ b) Employed in full-time (35 hours or more per week) civilian job
- ☐ c) Employed in part-time (less than 35 hours per week) civilian job
- ☐ d) Unemployed, looking for work
- ☐ e) Unemployed, not looking for work
- ☐ f) Attending college
- ☐ g) Attending trade/vocational school
- ☐ h) Not in school
- ☐ i) Other (please specify): \_\_\_\_\_

29. Please use the space below to make comments on this survey or on your participation in the ARNG. If you refer to a particular question, please note its number. Use the back of this page if additional space is needed.

Thank you for your cooperation. Please return the completed questionnaire in the enclosed postage-paid envelope.

## APPENDIX C

### Soldier Questionnaire

# 29th Infantry Division (Light) MFO Impact Questionnaire

#### **Confidentiality Notification**

**This notification is to inform you of who is conducting this survey and what use will be made of the information being collected, in accordance with Public Law 93-573, the Privacy Act of 1974. This survey was compiled and is being administered by personnel of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, in Alexandria, Virginia, as part of a research project on peacekeeping operations. This research is authorized by acts of Congress which authorize recruitment and maintenance of military forces and authorizes research to accomplish this goal. This authority is in 10 United States Code, Section 3033. The use of Social Security numbers is authorized by Executive Order 9397. Survey participation is voluntary. Information on individuals is confidential and will not be used by nor released to anyone. Information on groups of soldiers will be used only for research and policy analysis.**

## 29th Infantry Division (Light) MFO Impact Questionnaire

### General Instructions

The purpose of this questionnaire is to determine what readiness and training impact, if any, the 29th ID(L) is experiencing as a result of providing soldiers for the Sinai peacekeeping (PK) mission. You have been selected randomly to help make this determination by completing the enclosed questionnaire.

1. Name \_\_\_\_\_
2. Soc Sec # \_\_\_\_\_
3. Battalion \_\_\_\_\_
4. Company \_\_\_\_\_
5. Platoon \_\_\_\_\_
6. Grade/Rank (check one):
 

ENLISTED	OFFICERS
<input type="checkbox"/> E8/MSG-1SG	<input type="checkbox"/> O2/1LT
<input type="checkbox"/> E7/SFC	<input type="checkbox"/> O1/2LT
<input type="checkbox"/> E6/SSG	
<input type="checkbox"/> E5/SGT	
<input type="checkbox"/> E4/CPL-SPC	
<input type="checkbox"/> E3/PFC	
<input type="checkbox"/> E2/PVT2	
<input type="checkbox"/> E1/PVT1	
7. Current duty assignment (check one):
 

<input type="checkbox"/> Platoon Leader
<input type="checkbox"/> Platoon Sgt
<input type="checkbox"/> Squad Leader
<input type="checkbox"/> Squad Member
<input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify): _____
8. How many years and months of Army National Guard service have you completed?  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Years and \_\_\_\_\_ Months
9. How many years and months of active duty service have you completed?  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Years and \_\_\_\_\_ Months
10. How many years and months have you been in your current company?  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Years and \_\_\_\_\_ Months

11. How many years and months have you been in your current duty assignment?

\_\_\_\_ Years and \_\_\_\_ Months

## Training Impact

12. Overall, how has training in your company been impacted by the PK mission?

- ☐ Positive impact
- ☐ Negative impact
- ☐ No impact (Skip to Q.13)

12a. How great has this training impact been? (Circle one)

Minor Impact					Major Impact
1	2	3	4	5	

13. Have you been impacted by the departure of the PK volunteers in any of the following ways? (Check all that apply.)

- ☐ Promotion opportunities
- ☐ Assumption of additional duties
- ☐ Receipt of additional training
- ☐ Other (specify):

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14. Has any of your critical training been delayed until new/additional trainers become prepared?

☐ Yes ☐ No

15. In what other ways have you had to modify your own training because of the PK mission?

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## Morale

16. Has the general level of morale changed in your company as a result of the PK mission?

- ☐ Positive change
- ☐ Negative change
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.17)

16a. How great has this change in morale been?

Minor Change					Major Change	
1	2	3	4	5		

17. Has your morale changed as a result of the PK mission?

- ☐ Positive change
- ☐ Negative change
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.18)

17a. How great has the change in your morale been?

Minor Change					Major Change	
1	2	3	4	5		

18. Have you had to work longer hours as a result of the PK mission?

☐ Yes      ☐ No (Skip to Q.19)

18a. If yes, how many more hours each week, on average, have you had to work as a result of the PK mission? \_\_\_\_\_ Hours

18b. Why have you had to work longer hours? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

19. Taking everything into consideration, how disruptive has the assignment of soldiers to the PK mission been to your company?

Not Disruptive					Very	
At All					Disruptive	
1	2	3	4	5		

## Volunteering for the Sinai PK Mission

20. Would you like to see the 29th ID(L) participate in more assignments like the PK mission?

☐ Yes ☐ No

21. Have you ever been to the Sinai on a peacekeeping mission?

☐ Yes ☐ No

22. Did you volunteer for the current PK mission?

☐ Yes ☐ No (Skip to Q.24)

23. Did you volunteer for the Sinai deployment and then withdraw?

☐ Yes ☐ No

24. How easy or difficult would it have been for you to return to your former civilian job if you had gone on the PK mission?

- ☐ Very easy
- ☐ Easy
- ☐ Neither easy nor difficult
- ☐ Difficult
- ☐ Very difficult
- ☐ Don't know

25. Would you volunteer for a future PK mission?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Undecided

26. Were you provided with sufficient information from which to make an informed decision about volunteering for the Sinai PK mission?

☐ Yes ☐ No

27. Was the information you received accurate?

☐ Yes ☐ No

28. In what ways could recruitment for the PK mission have been improved?

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## Troop Return

29. Do you anticipate any significant problems following the return of the PK soldiers?

☐ Yes ☐ No

30. If yes, what problems do you anticipate? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

### Readiness

The following section is concerned with unit (company) readiness. Our interest is not in your company's readiness level today, but in whether there has been a **change** in readiness level since soldiers left your company to participate in the PK mission..

31. Has there been a change in the capability of officers and NCOs to lead your company?

- ☐ Positive change (increased capability)  
☐ Negative change (decreased capability)  
☐ No change (Skip to Q.32)

31a. How much change in leadership capability has occurred?

Minor Change			Major Change	
1	2	3	4	5

31b. To what extent can this change in leadership capability be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All			Totally	
1	2	3	4	5

32. Has there been a change in your capability to qualify on your weapons?

- ☐ Positive change (increased capability)  
☐ Negative change (decreased capability)  
☐ No change (Skip to Q.33)

32a. How much change in your weapons qualification capability has occurred?

Minor Change			Major Change	
1	2	3	4	5

32b. To what extent can this change be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All				Totally
1	2	3	4	5

33. Has there been a change in your combat readiness?

- ☐ Positive change (increased readiness)
- ☐ Negative change (decreased readiness)
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.34)

33a. How much change in your combat readiness has occurred?

Minor Change				Major Change
1	2	3	4	5

33b. To what extent can this change be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All				Totally
1	2	3	4	5

34. Please feel free to use the space below to make additional comments about the PK mission. If you refer to a particular question in your comments, please note its number. Attach additional pages if more space is needed.

Thank you for your cooperation. As soon as possible, please return the completed questionnaire in the enclosed postage-paid envelope.

## APPENDIX D

### Readiness Group Questionnaire

## 29th Infantry Division (Light) Readiness Group Questionnaire

### **Confidentiality Notification**

**This notification is to inform you of who is conducting this survey and what use will be made of the information being collected, in accordance with Public Law 93-573, the Privacy Act of 1974. This survey was compiled and is being administered by personnel of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, in Alexandria, Virginia, as part of a research project on peacekeeping operations. This research is authorized by acts of Congress which authorize recruitment and maintenance of military forces and authorizes research to accomplish this goal. This authority is in 10 United States Code, Section 3033. The use of Social Security numbers is authorized by Executive Order 9397. Survey participation is voluntary. Information on individuals is confidential and will not be used by nor released to anyone. Information on groups of soldiers will be used only for research and policy analysis.**

## 29th Infantry Division (Light) Readiness Group Questionnaire

### General Instructions

The purpose of this questionnaire is to determine what personnel, readiness and training impact, if any, the 29th ID(L) is experiencing as a result of providing soldiers for the Sinai peacekeeping (PK) mission. You have been identified as uniquely qualified to help make this determination. If you don't know the answer to a question, mark the Don't Know (DK) space and go on to the next item. If the question does not apply to you, mark the Not Applicable (NA) space and go on to the next item. Use the back of the sheet if your answers require additional space.

1. Name \_\_\_\_\_
2. Rank/Grade \_\_\_\_\_
3. Readiness Group \_\_\_\_\_
4. Duty position \_\_\_\_\_
5. When were you assigned to your Readiness Group's Infantry Team?  
Month \_\_\_\_\_ Year \_\_\_\_\_
6. Which of the following units fall within your area of responsibility as a member of your Readiness Group's Infantry Team?  

☐ 1-116 IN  
☐ 2-116 IN  
☐ 3-116 IN  
☐ 1-170 IN  
☐ 1-183 IN

7. In your words, briefly describe your duties/responsibilities with respect to the units you checked above.

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8. How many and how frequent are your contacts with the above units?

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14. In what other ways was it necessary for the units to modify their training because of the PK mission?

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Morale

15. Have the soldiers in those units expressed comments about the PK mission?  
\_\_\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No (Skip to Q.16) \_\_\_\_\_ DK (Skip to Q.16)

15a. What positive comments have you heard? \_\_\_\_\_

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15b. What negative comments have you heard? \_\_\_\_\_

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16. Were the soldiers in those units required to work longer hours as a result of the PK mission?

\_\_\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No (Skip to Q.17) \_\_\_\_\_ DK (Skip to Q.17)

16a. If yes, why were longer work hours required? \_\_\_\_\_

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17. Did you personally find it necessary to work longer hours as a result of the PK mission?

\_\_\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No (Skip to Q.18)

17a. If yes, how many more hours each week, on average, did you work as a result of the PK mission? \_\_\_\_\_ Hours

17b. Why were longer work hours necessary for you? \_\_\_\_\_

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18. Has the general level of morale changed in those units as a result of the PK mission?

- ☐ Positive change  
☐ Negative change  
☐ No change (Skip to Q.19)  
☐ DK (Skip to Q.19)

18a. How great was the change in morale?

Minor change

Major change

1 2 3 4 5

18b. Taking everything into consideration, how disruptive was the assignment of soldiers to the PK mission for their units?

Not disruptive At All

Very Disruptive

1 2 3 4 5

#### Volunteering for the Sinai PK Mission

19. Would you like to see the 29th ID(L) participate in more assignments like the PK mission?

☐ Yes ☐ No

20. Have you ever been to the Sinai on a peacekeeping deployment?

☐ Yes ☐ No

21. Were the soldiers in those units provided with sufficient information from which to make informed decisions about volunteering for the PK mission?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ DK

22. Was the information they received accurate?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ DK ☐ NA

23. In what ways could recruiting for the PK mission have been improved?

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#### Troop Return

24. Were you briefed on how PK soldiers would be integrated back into their units?

☐ Yes ☐ No

25. Have you observed any significant problems following the return of the PK soldiers?

\_\_\_\_\_ Yes      \_\_\_\_\_ No      \_\_\_\_\_ DK

25a. If yes, what problems have you observed? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

26. Has there been a change in the willingness of the unit's members to work together effectively as a cohesive team?

- \_\_\_\_\_ Positive change (unit currently shows more teamwork)  
\_\_\_\_\_ Negative change (unit currently shows less teamwork)  
\_\_\_\_\_ No change (Skip to Q.27)  
\_\_\_\_\_ DK (Skip to Q.27)  
\_\_\_\_\_ NA: I was not in a position to observe those units in the six months before soldiers departed (Skip to Q.27)

26a. How much change in teamwork has occurred?

Minor Change				Major Change
1	2	3	4	5

26b. To what extent can the change be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All				Totally
1	2	3	4	5

27. Has there been any change in the extent to which those units provide support for the families of their soldiers?

- \_\_\_\_\_ Positive change (more support)  
\_\_\_\_\_ Negative change (less support)  
\_\_\_\_\_ No Change (Skip to Q.28)  
\_\_\_\_\_ DK (Skip to Q.28)  
\_\_\_\_\_ NA (Skip to Q.28)

27a. How much change in support has occurred?

Minor Change				Major Change
1	2	3	4	5

27b. To what extent can the change in support be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All				Totally
1	2	3	4	5

28. Has there been a change in the capabilities of officers and NCOs to lead those units?

- ☐ Positive change (increased capability)
- ☐ Negative change (decreased capability)
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.29)
- ☐ DK (Skip to Q.29)

28a. How much change in leadership capabilities has occurred?

Minor Change					Major Change
1	2	3	4	5	

28b. To what extent can the change in leadership capabilities be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All			Totally	
1	2	3	4	5

29. Has there been a change in the capabilities of soldiers in those units to perform mission essential tasks?

- ☐ Positive change (increased capabilities)
- ☐ Negative change (decreased capabilities)
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.30)
- ☐ DK (Skip to Q.30)

29a. How much change in mission essential task performance capabilities has occurred?

Minor Change					Major Change
1	2	3	4	5	

29b. To what extent can the change be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All			Totally	
1	2	3	4	5

30. Has there been a change in those units' capabilities to qualify on their weapons?

- ☐ Positive change (increased capability)
- ☐ Negative change (decreased capability)
- ☐ No change (Skip to Q.31)
- ☐ DK (Skip to Q.31)

30a. How much change in weapons qualification capabilities has occurred?

Minor Change					Major Change
1	2	3	4	5	

30b. To what extent can the change be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All				Totally
1	2	3	4	5

31. Has there been a change in those units' overall combat readiness?

☐ Positive change (increased readiness)  
☐ Negative change (decreased readiness)  
☐ No change (Skip to Q.32)  
☐ DK (skip to Q.32)

31a. How much change in combat readiness has occurred?

Minor Change				Major Change
1	2	3	4	5

31b. To what extent can the change be attributed to the PK mission?

Not At All				Totally
1	2	3	4	5

32. Please use the space below to make comments on this survey. If you refer to a particular question, please note its number. Use the back of this page if additional space is needed.

Thank you for your cooperation. Please return the completed questionnaire in the enclosed postage-paid envelope.

## Appendix E

Junior Leaders'/Soldiers'  
Verbatim Responses to the Question:  
"In what ways could recruitment  
for the PK mission have been improved?"

This query appeared as Question 28 on the MFO Impact Questionnaire, Administered to Junior Leaders/Soldiers of the 29th Infantry Division (Light).

## Junior Leaders'/Soldiers' Recruitment Recommendations

002 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
BETTER INFORMATIONAL VIDEOS.

003 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
ALLOW MORE INFORMATION OUT TO THE TROOPS.

004 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
ALLOW AGR SOLDIERS TO GO WITHOUT CONCERN OF A POSITION UPON  
RETURN.

006 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
DON'T ALLOW SUCH A LONG LAY TIME FROM WHEN ASKING FOR VOLUNTEERS  
AND ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT. SEVERAL SOLDIERS BACKED OUT OF MISSION  
DUE TO CHANGES IN LIFE STYLE, IE NEW CAREER, OR MARRIAGE, ETC.

008 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
INCREASE AWARENESS TO SOLDIERS AND EMPLOYERS OF RIGHT TO REEMPLOY-  
MENT. PROMOTE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE. ALLOW R.C. SOLDIERS TO  
DEPLOY UNDER THEIR OWN COLORS.

010 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
ESGR RELATING TO EMPLOYERS THE SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE  
MISSION. ALSO LOBBYING UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES WITH THE SAME  
MESSAGE AS MANY GUARD MEMBERS ARE STUDENTS.

011 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
LESS TIME BETWEEN RECRUITMENT AND DEPLOYMENT. TIME LAG CREATED  
PROBLEMS WITH SOLDIERS CAUSING THEM TO PULL OUT.

012 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
A PERSONAL VISIT TO CO DRILL BY A PRIOR VETERAN OF A SUNAI  
MISSION 4-4/E-5, THIS PERSON WOULD HAVE CREDIBILITY WITH SOLDIERS  
MOST LIKELY TO VOLUNTEER.

## Junior Leaders'/Soldiers' Recruitment Recommendations

013 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
JUST DON'T PROMISE TRAINING OR MORALE ITEMS THAT WILL NOT HAPPEN  
(LEADER PROMISED TO ENLISTED SOLDIERS).

014 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MORE INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT TRAINING WILL TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE  
MISSION.

015 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MORE DETAILS AND COORDINATION.

017 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
"EMPLOYER APPRECIATION" DAYS FOR CIVILIAN BOSSES TO COME RIDE  
HELICOPTERS AND ETC.

019 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
(USE) ENTIRE NG FORCE.

020 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
UTILIZE COMBAT SERVICE AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL FOR SUPPORT OF  
PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

021 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
LET AGR SOLDIERS GET THE EXPERIENCE. FIX THE WAY WE REPORT THEM  
ON A USR. ACTUALLY RECRUIT NEW TROOPS FOR THE GUARD WITH THE  
SINAI MISSION AS THERE ACTIVE DUTY TRAINING AFTER BASIC AND AIT.

022 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
INFORMATION COULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED EARLIER AND THE SYSTEM OF  
PICKING HIGHER RANKS WAS NEVER VERY CLEAR.



## Junior Leaders'/Soldiers' Recruitment Recommendations

023 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
EARLIER ANNOUNCEMENT WITH A GREATER DEGREE OF MISSION  
RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTY POSITIONS THAT WERE BEING TASKED,  
EXPLAIN TO POTENTIAL VOLENTEERS WITH DETAILS MORE CLEARLY.

024 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
OPEN UP TO ALL RANKS.

025 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
BRIEFING OF SELECTION PROCESS OF PK SELECT-EES. POSSIBLY AN  
O.M.L. CROATED FOR PK SELECT-EES. BRIEFING INVOLVING WHAT  
QUALIFICATIONS WERE SOUGHT AFTER IN POTENTIAL CANIDATES FOR SINAI  
PK. POSSIBLE OML MIGHT HAVE GIVEN CANDIDATES AN IDEA OF WHO IS  
ELIGIBLE FROM THE START. SELECTION OF PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE  
BASED ON HIGHEST QUALITY SOLDIERS IN THE DIVISION, NOT BASED ON A  
BALANCED SELECTION BETWEEN BRIGADES.

027 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
GIVE SOLDIERS MORE TIME TO CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS OF GOING  
AWAY FOR A YEAR BEFORE THEY HAVE TO DECIDE. I THINK THIS WOULD  
REDUCE THE NUMBER OF SOLDIERS THAT WITHDRAW.

028 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
INSTEAD OF PEICE MEALING THE BATTALIONS/BRIDAGES, WE NEED TO  
DESIGNATE A BATTALION THAT WOULD MOBILIZE AND BE DEDICATED TO GO  
ON THE PEACE KEEPING MISSION. THIS WOULD ENSURE THAT MOST UNIT  
MEMBERS WOULD GO AS A UNIT AND NOT A COMPOSITE UNIT. THERE COULD  
BE A ROTATION OF BATTALIONS THEREBY PUTTING INTO EFFECT SO CALLED  
WAR PLANS FOR MOBILIZATION OF UNITS.

029 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
SHOULD BE MORE INTERESTED IN COMBAT EXPIERENCED SOLDIERS.

## Junior Leaders'/Soldiers' Recruitment Recommendations

030 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
IT STATED THAT IF A FULL TIME PERSONNEL WENT THEY WOULD BE  
REPLACED BY A TEMP. PERSONNEL. THIS DID NOT HAPPENED IN HHC. WE  
WERE LOOKING FOR TEMP HELP FOR HHC SUPPLY SGT.

031 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MEBEY IF IT WAS A SHORTER ROTATION.

032 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
RECRUITMENT COULD HAVE BEEN IMPROVED BY GOING INTO THE COMMUNI-  
TIES OF SOLDIERS AND INFORMING THE CITIZENS OF THE GOALS OF THE  
PK MISSION.

036 4 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
ACTUAL PEOPLE WHO HAVE SERVED IN THESE MISSIONS SHOULD RECRUIT.

038 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
GIVEN OUT MORE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION ON WHAT YOUR ASIGNMENT  
WOULD BE. CHANGING THE DECISION ON HOW YOU PICK VOLUNTERS  
BECAUSE I DID AND THE UNIT TO ME I WAS TO OLD AND COULDN'T PASS  
THE TRAINING.

039 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
THE NATIONAL GUARD, SPECIFICALLY IN MARYLAND, IS EXTREMELY POLITI-  
CAL. SOME SOLDIERS BUT ESPECIALLY THE OFFICERS IN MY BATTALION  
WERE CHOSEN PRIMARILY FROM A POLITICAL STANDPOINT (IE GOOD 'OLE  
BOY NETWORK). IT WOULD BE MUCH MORE FAIR FOR A REGULAR ARMY  
COMMISSION TO PICK THOSE BEST SUITED TO GO.

040 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MORE INFORMATION ON HOW THE MISSION WOULD AFFECT CIVILIAN EMPLOY-  
MENT.

042 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
GI BILL, RETURN TO SLOTS.

## Junior Leaders'/Soldiers' Recruitment Recommendations

043 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment INFORMATION OR RESOLUTION ON APPLICATIONS OF SOLDIER/SAIORS ACT (RE-EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS) FOR VOLENTEER ACTIVATION. ALSO LOSS OF PAY/BENEFITS WHILE ON DUTY.

044 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment CURRENTLY SUFFICIENT.

045 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment CONSISTENT INFO.

048 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment THE STATE COMMAND SHOULD NOT LIE TO ITS SOLDIERS WHEN SAYING THAT ALL OFFICERS COULD VOLEENTEER AND WOULD BE CONSIDERED. I FOUND OUT AFTERWARDS THAT NO OFFICERS FROM 2ND BRIGADE, 29TH ID WERE EVEN CONSIDERED SINCE WE WERE GOING TO JRTC, WHICH CAME WELL BEFORE THE SINAI.

049 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment LITTLE INFORMATION CONCERNING MISSION DISSIMINATED TO SOLDIERS. TOLD HOW MANY WANT TO GO? NOTHING ABOUT THE MISSION.

050 4 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment MORE STRAIGHT FORWARD. MORE INDEPTH.

076 4 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment ALL DETAILS SHOULD BE WORKED OUT BEFORE INFORMATION IS PRESENTED. INFO. CHANGED SEVERAL TIMES UNTIL SOME DECISIONS WERE REACHED.

078 4 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment WHITE LIES.

080 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment PK MISSIONS SHOULD BE ARMY AREA WIDE INITIALLY RATHER THAN DIVISION SPECIFIC. INDIVIDUALS GENERALLY DO NOT JOIN THE NATIONAL GUARD TO BE FULL TIME SOLDIERS. LOGICALLY, ANY NG DIVI-

## Junior Leaders'/Soldiers' Recruitment Recommendations

SION WOULD BE HARD PRESSED TO FILL THE TOTAL REQUIREMENTS OF THESE MISSIONS. RECRUITING FROM THE SECOND ARMY AREA FOR EXAMPLE WOULD HAVE BEEN A BETTER INITIAL STEP AND SAVED A LOT OF TIME IN SCREENING WANT-TO-BE'S THAT HAD MARGINAL QUALIFICATIONS. ONLY TO FIND THAT THE SEARCH HAD TO BE BROADENED. SELECT A DIVISION FLAG AND DO AN ARMY WIDE RECRUITMENT.

081 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
NOTIFICATION OF MISSION EARLIER WOULD HELP SOLDIER THINK IT OVER  
AND TALK TO FAMILY.

082 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
THE SELECTION PROCESS FOR OFFICERS AND SENIOR NCO'S WAS EXTREMELY  
POLITICAL IN NATURE. SHOULD BE BASED UPON MERIT ONLY.

083 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
BY DEPLOYING THE BATTALION AS A GROUP. MY OPINION ONLY.

084 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
BG LANGLEY TOLD EVERYONE THAT INITIALLY SIGNING UP WAS NOT A  
COMMITMENT. HOWEVER ALL WHO SIGNED ORIGINALLY WERE FORCED TO  
WRITE AND SIGN A STATEMENT OF WHY THEY WERE NO LONGER VOLUNTEERS.  
TROOPS NEED TO KNOW THE FACTS, ALL OF THEM, UP FRONT!!

085 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
PAMPHLETS EXPLAINING MISSION AND DUTIES OF PK'ERS - HOW LAWS  
PROTECT EMPLOYEES - DISCUSSION OF RECRUITING W/EMPLOYERS OF  
INTERESTED SOLDIERS.

086 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
EARLIER ANNOUNCEMENT, BETTER EMPLOYER COOPERATION, FAIRER AND  
MORE EFFICIENT NOTIFICATION OF ACCEPTANCE. .

## Junior Leaders'/Soldiers' Recruitment Recommendations

088 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
HAVING A SET TIME TABLE. HAVE VOLUNTEE TIME AND DEPLOYMENT TIME  
CLOSER. TOO MUCH TIME BEFORE GOING TO FT. BRAGG. AFTER THEY HAD  
VOLUNTEE.

089 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO MOBILIZE A BATTALION INSTEAD OF  
ASKING FOR VOLUNTEERS. IT WOULD HAVE HAD A MORE POSITIVE IMPACT  
ON THE SOLDIERS AND WOULD HAVE MADE THE BATTALION MORE COHESIVE.

090 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
LESS BRIEFINGS AND MORE WRITTEN DOCTMENTATION ABOUT THE MISSION  
AND IF BRIEFINGS ARE MANADITORY THEN SOLDIERS WHO HAVE BEEN TO  
THE SINIA PK MISSION IN THE PAST SHOULD BRIEV NOT SOMEONE WHO HAS  
NEVER DONE THE MISSION.

091 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
YOU NEED TO USE SOLDIERS THAT HAVE PERFORMED THIS MISSION WITH A  
POSITIVE ATTITUDE. THAT WOULD INHANCE RECRUITING. (TRUTH).

093 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
IN ORDER TO RECIEVE ACCURATE INFORMATION. DETAILED INFORMATION  
HAS TO BE PROVIDED. GENERAL INFORMATION IS NOT ENOUGH.

094 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
THERE WAS INITIALLY A BIG PUSH FOR VOLUNTEERS. AFTERWARDS LITTLE  
INFORMATION WAS FORTHCOMING UNTIL IS SLOWED TO A TRICKLE.  
BATTALION HAS A TOUGH TIME GETTING INFO FROM HIGHER, ESPECIALLY  
DIVISION HQ'S.

096 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
NATURALLY BY RETURNING SOLDERS COMMENTS

097 4 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
FURTHER AND MORE THOROUGH INFORMATION ABOUT THE MNISSION, AL-  
THOUGH NOT MUCH IMPROVEMENT WOULD BE NEEDED.

## Junior Leaders'/Soldiers' Recruitment Recommendations

098 4 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
WE COULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN MORE DETAILS AS TO WHAT THE MISSION WAS.  
WHAT I'VE LEARNED WAS SOMEWHAT VAGUE INFLUENCED MY DECISION NOT  
TO VOLUNTEER OR WITHDRAW MY VOLUNTEERING.

106 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
BY ALLOWING ALL RANKS TO GO, THOSE WHO VOLUNTEER, REGARDLESS OF  
RANK OR POSITIONS.

111 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
BETTER ADVANCE NOTICE. ONCE APPLICATIONS WERE SUBMITTED, NOT  
MUCH WAS DISCUSSED ABOUT IT.

113 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
RECRUITMENT COULD BE IMPROVED BY GOING TO LOCAL HIGHSCHOOLS AND  
RECRUITING FOR THE GUARD AND USING THIS PK MISSION AS ONE OF THE  
RECRUITMENT INCENTIVIES.

114 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
BY BEING WELL INFORMED AHEAD OF TIME. BY MAKING SURE THE CHAIN  
OF COMMAND INFORM THE SOLDIERS BY MAILING OUT INFORMATION TO ONES  
ADDRESS! ASKING FOR VOLUNTEER.

118 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
I READ IN THE ARMY TIMES WHERE AC SOLDIERS COMPLAINED ABOUT  
DISHONEST RECRUITING TECHNIQUES. THIS PRACTICE IS AN ARMY WIDE  
DEMOTIVATOR. I UNDERSTAND ABOUT THE PERSONNEL CRUNCH, BUT  
SOLDIERS DESERVE THE SERVICE OF HONEST RECRUITMENT.

120 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
NONE. RECRUITMENT WAS GOOD IN MY BATTALION.

122 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
PROVIDE MORE OF AN ADVANCED NOTICE.

## Junior Leaders'/Soldiers' Recruitment Recommendations

123 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MORE GUIDANCE 12 MONTHS OUTON SLOT ?-AUAFCABFCFTY-? (AVAILABIL-  
ITY) AND SCREENING SELECTIONS.

124 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
I DO NOT FEEL THAT I HAVE BEEN IN THE UNIT LONG ENOUGH TO MAKE A  
FAIR ASSESSMENT OF THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS. I BECAME PART OF THE  
UNIT SHORTLY BEFORE THE DEADLINE.

125 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
ENLISTED SOLDIERS NEED A BETTER IDEA OF THE REALITIES FINANCIAL  
AND OTHERWISE - OF ACTIVE DUTY LIFE - ALSO, EMPLOYERS SHOULD BE  
BETTER INFORMED OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS.

126 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
SELECTION OF QUALIFIED OFFICERS FROM A GREATER VARIETY OF BATTAL-  
IONS.

128 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
I FEAL THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE TASKED A WHOLE UNIT TO COMPLETE THE  
MISSION. THIS WOULD HAVE LESS IMPACT ON ALL CONCEARNED.

131 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
GET THE SOLDIERS MORE TIME TO PREPARE FOR DEPARTURE.

133 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MANY SOLDIERS WANTED TO PARTICIPATE BUT FAMILY OBLIGATIONS AND  
EDUCATIONAL PLANS TOOK PRECEDENCE.

143 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
A LOT OF THINGS WERE LAST MINUTE. A DECISION LIKE THIS NEEDS TO  
BE MADE WITH FAMILY. THERE SHOULD BE A 4 TO 6 MONTH NOTICE  
BEFORE VOLUNTEERING. THIS WILL KEEP THOSE FROM VOLUNTEERING AND  
THEN BACKING OUT AND GIVE SOLDIERS TIME TO CONSULT WITH FAMILY  
AND EMPLOYERS.

## Junior Leaders'/Soldiers' Recruitment Recommendations

146 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MORE PICTURES WHAT YOU WOULD BE DOING AND SOME OF THE TRAINING.

147 4 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MAKE THE SOLIDER AWARE OF PK MISSION EARLY THAN JUST A MONTH  
BEFORE OUR FINAL DECISION MUST BE MADE.

149 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MANY OF US WILL NOT DEPLOY WITH ANY OTHER UNIT EXCEPT B. COMPOS-  
ITE UNITS SUCH AS THOSE USE IN PK SEEMS A LOT LIKE THE UNIT I WAS  
WITH DURING DESERT STORM - UNTRUSTWORTH - RECEIVED RAW END OF  
DEAL.

150 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
SHOW A VIDEO OF THE MISSION.

152 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
VOLUNTEERS COMING BACK TELLING THE SOLDIERS EXACTLY WHAT IT WAS  
LIKE.

153 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
THEY DIDN'T KNOW HOW MANY VOLUNTEERS WERE GOING TO SIGN. SO THEY  
COULDN'T TELL US WHAT OUR CHANCES WERE.

154 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
NO POLITICAL SELECTIONS AT THE OFFICER LEVEL. (OUTSIDE SELECTION)

155 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
BRING MORE INFORMATION PAMPHLETS IN WHICH MIGHT EXPLAINED WHAT  
WAS OUR MISSION AS MFO. AS A CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE I DIDN'T GET TO  
MUCH INFORMATION REGARDING OUR RIGHTS WHEN WE ARE SERVING IN A  
MFO MISSION.



## Junior Leaders'/Soldiers' Recruitment Recommendations

156 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
I THINK TOO MUCH TIME ELAPSED BETWEEN THE TIME OF RECRUITMENT AND  
THE TIME DEPLOYED.

159 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
NO IMPROVEMENT OTHER THAN KEEP THE PROMISES THAT WERE MADE.

160 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
SUSPENSES FOR COMPLETION OF VOLUNTEER PACKETS WERE SHORT.  
SOLDIERS AND QUESTIONS CONCERNING ASSIGNMENTS AND DEPLOYMENT  
INFORMATION THAT COULD NOT BE ANSWERED DURING INTERVIEW PHASE.

161 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
I DO BELIEVE THAT THOSE OF US THAT DID VOLUNTEER AND THEN COULD  
NOT GO BECAUSE OF A.T. SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT BEFORE WE  
SIGNED UP.

162 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
HAVE THE ARMY TALKING TO FAMILY MEMBERS AND EMPLOYERS SO THEY  
UNDERSTAND FULLY ABOUT THE MISSION.

163 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE MISSION POSITIONS WERE CO-FILLED BY THE  
ACTIVE UNIT. IT SEEM TO ME THAT THE "PLUM" POSITIONS WENT TO THE  
ACTIVE UNITS. BEING A PRIOR MEMBER OF THE 1ST BN 505TH AIRBORNE  
INFANTRY. I CAN SEE HOW AN ATTEMPT WOULD HAVE BEEN MADE TO DO  
THIS EVEN UN-INTENTIONALLY BY THE PLANNERS. I OFTEN HEARD  
COMMENTS FROM THE SOLDIERS STATING THEY WOULD LOVE TO VOLUNTEER  
IF THEY DIDN'T LOOSE RANK IN THE PROCESS. THEIR COMMUNITY  
SUPPORT FOR THE MISSION IE; EMPLOYERS AND FAMILY WAS GENERALLY  
FAVORABLE.

164 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
GIVE THE SOLDIER MORE TIME TO MAKE A DECISION.

Junior Leaders'/Soldiers' Recruitment Recommendations

166 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
HAVE PRIOR SINAI MFO PK SOLDIER MAKE SOME OF THE COMPANY LEVEL  
BRIEFINGS, SOLDIERS OF DIFFERENT RANK E-1 - 03 TO RELATE THIER  
PROSPECTIVE.

170 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
DIVISION SUPPORT SHOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER.

172 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
BETTER COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION, TO COMPANIES AND OR  
SOLIDERS, BOTH IN WRITTEN AND VERBAL FORM.

173 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MORE TIME TO MAKE A DECISION THE PERCEPTION WAS THAT VOLUNTEERS  
HAD A VERY TIGHT WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY IN WHICH TO VOLUNTEER.

174 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MORE ADVANCE NOTICE.

179 4 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
EXACT DATES SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN WELL IN ADVANCE.

180 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MORE INTENSIVE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION AND MORE EMPHASIS BY LEADER-  
SHIP AT ALL LEVELS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF MISSION. ADDITIONALLY  
MORE SUPPORT FOR AGR SOLDIERS VOLUNTEERING.

182 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MORE EXCITING PK MISSION, LIKE BOSNIA. FINANCIAL BONUSES..

185 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
EMPHASIZE ON TRAINING PRETAINING TO PK MISSION.

## Junior Leaders'/Soldiers' Recruitment Recommendations

187 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MORE FILL ON THE MISSION.

188 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
BRING SOLDIERS WHO HAVE RECENTLY RETURNED FROM A PK MISSION TO  
OUR ARMORY TO SPEAK TO US ABOUT THEIR MISSION TO ANSWER/CLARIFY  
QUESTIONS WE MAY HAVE.

191 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
GIVING ADEQUATE TIME TO SOLDIER TO PREPARE THEMSELVES PHYSICALLY  
AND MENTALLY TO TAKE CARE OF PERSONAL THINGS AND ALLOW THEM  
OPPORTUNITY TO SATISFY OTHER OBLIGATIONS.

192 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MORE ADVANCED NOTICE

196 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
INCREASE THE TOUR LENGTH

197 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
FOCUS ON TAKING AS MUCH OF ONE NG BN AS POSSIBLE. THE SOLDIERS  
IN OUR BN HAVE TRAINED TOGETHER FOR MANY YEARS AND KNOW HOW TO  
WORK WITH EACH OTHER. THIS TRUST AND UNDERSTANDING IS LOST WHEN  
THE SOLDIERS ARE TAKEN FROM MANY UNITS. ALSO, SOLDIERS ARE MORE  
LIKELY TO VOLUNTEER IF LOTS OF OTHERS SOLDIERS FROM THEIR PLATOON  
DID SO.

198 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MORE DETAILS OF WHAT IS EXPECTED OF SOLDIER. THESE SOLDIERS THAT  
WENT, FOR THE MOST PART, HAVE NEVER BEEN ON ACTIVE DUTY AND DO  
NOT KNOW WHAT TYPE OF HOURS EACH INDIVIDUAL IS EXPECTED TO DO.  
GIVE A MORE DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EACH DUTY POSITION.

199 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
SEEMED OK TO ME.

## Junior Leaders'/Soldiers' Recruitment Recommendations

201 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
THERE APPEARED TO BE VERY LITTLE OPPORTUNITY FOR NONE INF.  
OFFICERS TO GO TO THE SIPAI (?).

202 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
I DID NOT GET INVOLVED IN ANY DEGREE BECAUSE I WAS CONSIDERED NON  
DEPLOYABLE AT THAT TIME.

203 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
PROVIDE SOLDIERS WITH MORE ASSURANCE OF LEGAL COMMITMENTS EMPLOY-  
ERS HAVE TO PROVIDE FOR RE-EMPLOYMENT AFTER A DEPLOYMENT

206 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
PERSONAL LECTURE BY RETURNING SOLDIERS - WITH A/V.

207 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
STRAIGHT FORWARD ANSWERS, FILMS, TRAINING, TIME OF LEAVE, WHEN,  
HOW LONG, IF I HAVE FAMILY PROBLEMS WOULD I BE ABLE TO COME HOME  
FOR HOW LONG, WHAT PAY, HOW MUCH.

208 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MORE DETAIL ABOUT WHAT YOUR DUTIES WOULD BE. WHY SUCH A LONG  
TRAIN UP PERIOD. MORE TIME TO DECIDE.

209 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
I FEEL THE RECRUITMENT WAS SUFFICIENT, AND GAVE ALL ASPECTS OF  
THE PURPOSE OF THE MISSION. IT MAY BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A PAST  
MEMBER OF THE MISSION BE THERE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS.

210 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
COMPANY AND PLT. LEVEL LEADERS SHOULD BE BETTER INFORMED OF THE  
STATUS OF THE SOLDIERS THAT VOLUNTEERED. A MORE RAPID RESPONSE  
TO THE SOLDIERS QUALIFICATION WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL.

## Junior Leaders'/Soldiers' Recruitment Recommendations

213 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MORE DETAIL EARLIER, QUICKER SELECTION PROCESS.

215 4 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
BY NOT ASKING. .

216 4 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
THEY COULD HAVE INFORMED COMPANY COMMANDERS AT AN EARLIER DATE OF  
THE MISSION THEY WOULD INFORM SOLDIERS.

219 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
I CAN NOT COMMENT BECAUSE I WAS OTHERWISE ENGAGED.

221 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
I'M SATISFIED WITH THE CURRENT RECRUITMENT PROCEDURES.

227 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
DONT'T KNOW IT WAS SUFFICIENT.

230 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
HAVE A PRESCREENING FOR ALL APPLICANTS.

231 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MORE INFORMATION PUT OUT. START EARLYER WITH WHAT NEED TO BE  
DONE.

237 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MORE INFO ABOUT WHAT SOLDIERS WOULD BE DOING FROM DAY TO DAY.

238 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
RECRUITMENT WAS FINE.

## Junior Leaders'/Soldiers' Recruitment Recommendations

242 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
HAVE A SOLDIER PRESENT WHO HAS BEEN ON A PK TOUR TO FIELD QUESTIONS DURING RECRUITING PRESENTATION.

243 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
COHORT UNITS

245 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
AT THAT TIME I WAS IN SCHOOL, FT. HUACHVEA, AZ, AND A CLASSMATE FROM ANOTHER BN TOLD ME ABOUT IT

246 1 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
SEND A SINGLE BATTALION SO AN ENTIRE BN COULD GROW WITH ITS OWN TROOPS.

249 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
IF BENIFITS, GI BILL, WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISRUPTED AND TIMING WAS RIGHT.

251 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
EVERYONE THAT VOLUNTEERS FOR A MISSION SHOULD BE SCREEN AND GIVEN A CHANCE TO GO.

253 3 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
MORE INFORMATION- THE VIDEO WAS NICELY PRODUCED, BUT FAILED TO PROVIDE AN INDEPTH UNDERSTANDING OF THE MISSION. MORE WRITTEN MATERIAL AND LESS "PR" WOULD BE NICE.

254 2 28: How to improve PK mission recruitment  
ONE ON ONE DISCUSSION WITH INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS THAT VOLUNTEER FOR SINAI PK MISSION.

## APPENDIX F

Senior Leader Verbatim  
Responses to the Question:  
"In what ways could recruitment  
for the PK mission have been improved?"

This query appeared as Question 39 on the first administration of the 29th Infantry Division (Light) Company and Battalion Senior Leadership Questionnaire.

Senior Leaders' Recruitment Recommendations

007 072 1 1 39

MORE PRIOR NOTICE OF A MISSION.

008 043 1 3 39

INFORMATION DEVELOPED FOR EMPLOYERS TO VIEW AND UNDERSTAND TO MINIMIZE THE IMPACT OF LEAVING THE CIVILIAN JOB.

009 081 1 3 39

VISITS BY 82ND SOLDIERS/OFFICERS WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED IN PK MISSION (S).

012 031 1 3 39

BY HAVING A DESIGNATED PK SOLDIER HANDLE ALL BRIEFING AND IS FAMILIAR WITH FAMILY MATTERS AND HOW TO HANDLE THE FAMILY MATTERS IF THEY ARISE. THIS PK SOLDIER SHOULD OF HAVE BEEN THRU A PK MISSION AND KNOW WHAT PROBLEMS THAT COULD ARISE FOR A SOLDIERS WHO WOULD BE AWAY FROM HOME FOR A YEAR.

020 073 1 3 39

I THINK A DETAILED PLAN OF WHAT IS EXPECTED OF THEM AND WHAT THEY NEED TO PREPARE FOR PK MISSION.

024 021 1 3 39

IF SOLDIERS WERE UP FOR PROMOTION PRIOR TO GOING TO THE OR (ON) PK MISSION THE(Y) SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROMOTED WHILE THERE OR IMMEDIATELY UPON THEIR RETURN - THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN A PROMISE.

028 032 1 2 39

THERE WAS WAY TOO MUCH LEAD TIME BETWEEN WHEN THEY VOLUNTEER AND WHEN THEY LEFT.

030 023 1 1 39

RECRUITMENT IN B-2/116 WAS GREAT, I HAD ABOUT 22 TO SIGN UP MOST OF THEM NCO'S AND OFFICERS. BUT NO NCO'S GOT THE CHANCE TO GO BECAUSE HIGHER-UP STATED THEIR WERE TO MUCH OF MY LEADERSHIP



## Senior Leaders' Recruitment Recommendations

VOLUNTEERING TO GO, AND THAT THE (NTC), NOT AWAY, TRAINING CENTER WAS A HIGHER PRIORITY.

031 084 1 3 39

ELIMINATE THE MIDDLEMAN, AN INFORMED INDIVIDUAL FOR FUTURE MISSIONS- SHOULD COME FROM THE ACTIVE COMPONENT - DIRECTLY TO THE UNITS.

036 053 1 2 39

A BONUS FOR THOSE THAT VOLUNTEERED, LIKE COLLEGE ASSISTANCE BEYOND WHAT THE GUARD GIVES. REDUCED TAX BREAK FROM FEDERAL AND STATE.

038 051 1 3 39

THE SELECTION PROCESS NEEDS TO BE KNOWN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, NOT MONTHS LATER. A SOLDIER NEEDS TO KNOW FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ESPECIALLY ONE WITH FAMILY.

044 022 1 3 39

TELL STAFF TO STOP LOOKING FOR ONLY PRETTY USDA CHOICE TROOPS, IF THEY HAD SENT AVERAGE TROOPS, YOU WOULD HAVE HAD MORE.

052 011 1 3 39

ADVISE SOLDIERS WHAT THEIR CIVILIAN RIGHTS ARE CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT AND THE NATIONAL GUARD, WAR POWERS ACT, ETC.

055 084 1 39

DON'T KNOW, WAS NOT GIVEN ANY DETAILS TO SUPPORT MISSION, MY UNIT SEEMS TO KEEP IT DIRECTED ONLY AT THOSE WHO VOLUNTEERED, (ALL TROOPS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO SIT IN ON BRIEFING AND A TOP OFFICIAL (OR SOMEONE WHO HAS AUTHORITY OVER WHAT IS TOLD TO RECRUITS SHOULD DO BRIEFINGS.

Senior Leaders' Recruitment Recommendations

056 063 1 2 39

BRING IN SOLDIERS FROM PREVIOUS PK MISSIONS TO BRIEF POTENTIAL VOLUNTEERS.

058 014 1 2 39

A BETTER AND EARLIER BRIEFING SHOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE SOLDIERS AND THEIR FAMILIES 6 MONTHS OUT INSTEAD OF 1-2 MONTHS.

071 071 1 3 39

NONE - THE PRESENTATIONS WERE WELL RECEIVED BY THE SOLDIERS.

076 083 1 1 39

ONCE COL BLUM VOLUNTEERED THE 29TH DIVISION FOR THIS MISSION, AT THAT POINT WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN PLACE ON ACTIVE DUTY.

078 052 1 3 39

CO A 1ST BN 183RD INFANTRY SUPPLIED 5 VOLUNTEERS TO THE SINAI MFO BATTALION. THIS UNIT WAS INITIALLY BRIEFED ON THE SINAI MFO MISSION IN JANUARY OR FEBRUARY OF 1994. THE BRIEFING WAS INFORMATIVE AND THE BASIC TIME LINE FOR ENTRY ON TO ACTIVE DUTY (STAGGERED BASED ON RANK) PROVED TO BE FOR THE MOST PART ACCURATE. THE INITIAL RESPONSE OF THE MEN WAS EXTREMELY SUPPORTIVE. EVEN THOSE OF US THAT KNEW FROM THE VERY START THAT OUR COMMITMENTS AT HOME WOULD PREVENT US FROM VOLUNTEERING FOR THE PK FORCE, WERE VERY PROUD THAT THE NATIONAL GUARD AND THE 29TH ID(L) WAS BEING GIVEN THIS OPPORTUNITY. WE INITIALLY HAD 21 OF APPROX. 110 MEN VOLUNTEER. THIS IS WHERE THE RECRUITING PROCESS WAS FLAWED. WE WERE BRIEFED ON SATURDAY NIGHT, AND THERE WAS A SENSE OF URGENCY TO GET ALL VOLUNTEER STATEMENTS COMPLETED AND SIGNED BY SUNDAY AFTERNOON. FULL TIME SUPPORT PERSONNEL WERE PUSHED TO PUT TOGETHER AND FORWARD ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT PACKETS (CLOTHING RECORDS, TRAINING RECORDS, ETC.) WITHIN A MATTER OF DAYS. THIS WAS ENTIRELY TOO GREAT A DECISION TO RUSH IN THIS MANNER. SOME OF THE VOLUNTEERS WERE YOUNG MEN MERELY SWEEPED UP IN THE "EXCITEMENT" OF THE MOMENT. OTHERS WERE FAMILY MEN WITH CONSIDERABLE FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT COMMITMENTS, WHO WERE ASKED TO VOLUNTEER BEFORE THEY EVEN HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH THEIR FAMILIES OR EMPLOYERS. THIS BEING THE CASE, APPROXIMATELY

## Senior Leaders' Recruitment Recommendations

5 MEN WITHDREW THEIR NAMES WITHIN TWO WEEKS, AFTER SUBSTANTIAL WORK AND MANHOURS HAD BEEN SPENT PROCESSING THEIR PACKETS. THE FACT THAT THEY WITHDREW IS NOT A POOR REFLECTION ON THEM, IT WAS JUST A MATTER OF "REALITY SETTING IN." THEN, AFTER THE INITIAL RUSH AND SENSE OF URGENCY, WE HEARD NOTHING FOR MONTHS. VOLUNTEER SOLDIERS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THEIR STATUS AS THEY TRIED TO MAKE PLANS FOR THE FUTURE. QUITE A FEW WERE COLLEGE STUDENTS WHO WERE PREPARED TO LAY OUT OF SCHOOL FOR A YEAR IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE. WE WERE UNABLE TO GIVE THEM ANY CONCRETE INFORMATION. WE HEARD "THROUGH THE GRAPE VINE," THOUGH IT WAS NEVER OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED, THAT NO ONE FROM THE 2ND BRIGADE WOULD BE CHOSEN DUE TO THE FACT THAT WE WERE SCHEDULED TO GO THE JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER FOR ANNUAL TRAINING IN JULY 1995. FINALLY, IN APPROX. AUGUST 1994 WE LEARNED THAT APPROX. 12-14 OF OUR ORIGINAL VOLUNTEERS HAD BEEN CHOSEN FOR THE MFO. ONCE AGAIN, THERE WAS A GREAT RUSH TO CONTACT THESE PERSONNEL AND PROCESS THEIR PAPERWORK. HOWEVER, BY THAT TIME MOST OF THESE MEN HAD GONE ON WITH THEIR LIVES AND MADE PLANS, I.E. PAID TUITION, ETC. ONLY 2 OF OUR ORIGINAL VOLUNTEERS WERE ABLE TO GO. OF THE OTHER 3 VOLUNTEERS THAT CAME FROM OUR UNIT, 2 WERE RECENT ENLISTMENTS AND 1 HAD NOT BEEN QUALIFIED AT THE TIME OF THE INITIAL RECRUITING DRIVE. THE SINAI PK FORCE LOST THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE MANY GOOD SOLDIERS DUE TO THE WAY THIS RECRUITMENT WAS HANDLED. I FEEL THAT THIS PROGRAM IS A GOOD ONE, PROVIDING THE NATIONAL GUARD WITH A MISSION IT CAN FULFILL AS PART OF THE TOTAL ARMY. HOWEVER, TO BE SUCCESSFUL I BELIEVE THAT FUTURE RECRUITMENTS FOR SIMILAR MISSIONS SHOULD BE HANDLED AS FOLLOWS:

- A. - MAKE THE INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT 9 MONTHS OUT FROM D-DAY. GET A TENTATIVE "FEEL" FOR HOW MANY SOLDIERS WANT TO PARTICIPATE. REFINE THIS LIST ON A MONTHLY BASIS. PROVIDE THE UNITS WITH MONTHLY INFORMATION UPDATES. LET THEM KNOW THAT VOLUNTEERS WILL BE ENLISTED AT D - 6 MONTHS, AND THAT A ROSTER OF THOSE ACCEPTED WILL BE PUBLISHED NO LATER THAN D - 4 MONTHS.
- B. - TAKE VOLUNTEER APPLICATIONS AT D - 6 MONTHS. MAKE IT PLAIN THAT ANYONE SIGNING UP AT THIS POINT SHOULD BE VERY SERIOUS ABOUT GOING.
- C. - PUBLISH ROSTER OF THOSE ACCEPTED NO LATER THAN D - 4 MONTHS.

SIMILAR MISSIONS IN THE FUTURE SHOULD BE ROTATED TO DIFFERENT NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS AROUND THE NATION. IF HANDLED IN THE MANNER DESCRIBED ABOVE, I BELIEVE THERE IS AN AMPLE POOL OF WILLING, GOOD QUALITY SOLDIERS AVAILABLE TO FILL THE RANKS OF SUCH UNITS. THERE IS ONE OTHER POINT THAT I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS. I HOPE THAT THERE IS NOT A MISCONCEPTION AT THE POLICY

## Senior Leaders' Recruitment Recommendations

MAKING LEVEL ABOUT A POSSIBLE LACK OF VOLUNTEERS AT THE SERIOR NCO AND OFFICER LEVEL. JUST BECAUSE OUR COMMITMENTS AT HOME PREVENTED US FROM VOLUNTEERING, DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE WOULD HAVE TRIED TO EVADE ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE HAD THE UNIT BEEN ACTIVATED AS A WHOLE. THERE IS A GREAT DIFFERENCE IN TELLING YOUR FAMILY AND EMPLOYER THAT "I CHOOSE TO LEAVE YOU FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME, AND TELLING THEM THAT "DUTY CALLS, AND IT IS MY DUTY AS A SOLDIER AND LEADER TO GO."

089 061 1 3 39

INSTEAD OF ASKING FOR VOLUNTEER'S - ACTIVATE UNIT AS A WHOLE.

092 093 1 1 39

HAVE SOMEONE WHO HAS BEEN ON PK MISSION IN SINAI, BRIEF SOLDIERS ABOUT CONDITIONS, FACILITIES, ETC.

094 054 1 3 39

SOLDIERS WERE ASKED ABOUT PK MISSION IN JAN 94, RECEIVED NO FURTHER INFORMATION UNTIL AUG 94.

099 013 1 3 39

BY UTILIZING A COMPLETE UNIT IE - BN, CO.

026 091 2 3 39

THE TOTAL UNIT DEPLOYED WOULD HAVE IMPROVED THE MISSION. EVERYONE SHOULD HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY IT WILL ALSO SHOW WHO WOULD GO OR SHOW IF CALLED TO COMBAT.

041 021 2 3 39

LET THE NCO'S HANDLE THE SOLDIER SELECTION OR AT LEAST HAVE THE NCO'S INVOLVED, WHICH DID NOT HAPPEN ON THIS PK MISSION. THE 29TH DIV. KEPT LOCAL SENIOR NCO'S OUT OF THE PICTURE.

Senior Leaders' Recruitment Recommendations

046 031 2 3 39

I FEEL THERE WAS TOO LONG OF A SPAN FROM THE TIME OF ASKING UNTIL ACTUALLY LEAVING. SIX TO NINE MONTH A LOT OF JUNIOR SOLDIER HAD TOME TO CHANGE THEIR MIND. JOB (CIVILIAN) CHANGES, HOME LIFE ETC. ORGINIAL NUMBER OF SOLDIERS WHO VOLUNTEER FROM BATTALION WAS 112.

079 061 2 3 39

DETAILS SUCH AS POSITION, UNEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS, PAY STATUS, ETL WOULD HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT PRIOR TO RECRUITING. IN SOME CASES, DETAILS HAVE BEEN DECIDED AFTER TROOPS DEPLOYED TO FT. BRAGG.

083 051 2 3 39

MORE LEAD TIME ON NOTIFICATION, INFORMATION FLOW TO VOLUNTEERS AND UNITS AFTER INITIAL VOLUNTEER DRIVE.

003 072 3 2 39

ALL THE MEN SHOULD BE SCREENED BEFORE THEY LEAVE THE AREA.

013 034 3 3 39

WE HAD PROBLEMS OF ANIMOSITY OF REGULAR ARMY AGAINST NATIONAL GUARDSMEN. THIS WAS BLATANT IN MANY CASES & DISCOURAGING FOR MANY. ELIMINATE THIS CONFLICT AND VOLUNTEERISM WILL PROBABLY INCREASE. ALSO PROMOTION ELIGIBILITY OF GUARDSMEN WHILE ON ACTIVE DUTY STATUS. SEE #66.

015 043 3 3 39

SOLDIERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SELECTED AND NOTIFIED THAT THEY WERE GOING 6 MONTHS OUT.

019 061 3 3 39

IF YOU WANT BETTER PERTICIPATION, HAVE THE PRESIDENT INVOKE THE WAR POWERS ACT.

## Senior Leaders' Recruitment Recommendations

025 032 3 2 39

THE SOLDIERS WERE PROMISED THAT IF THEY VOLUNTEERED THAT THEY WOULD ALL BE IN THE SAME PLATOON WITH ALL THE SOLDIERS IN THE 3/116 IN IN THE SAME COMPANY. THIS DIDN'T HAPPEN. IN THE FUTURE, I BELIEVE THE SOLDIERS WOULD WANT VARIFICATION OF WHAT THEY ARE TOLD.

033 021 3 2 39

THE SELECTION CRITERIA PROVIDED BY HIGHER COMMAND CONTINUED TO CHANGE AS THE PROCESS BEGAN IN REFERENCE TO ELIGIBILITY, EDUCATION, CURRENT DUTY ASSIGNMENT IN UNIT, ETC. WAS CONSTANTLY GETTING MIXED SIGNALS FROM HIGHER ON WHAT "TYPE" OF SOLDIER WAS CONSIDERED FOR DEPLOYMENT.

037 053 3 1 39

IDENTIFY SOLDIERS WHO WERE CURRENTLY UNEMPLOYED TO PARTICIPATE IN PK MISSIONS.

040 011 3 1 39

IN THE FUTURE ANY AGR OR TECHNICIAN VOLUNTEERING FOR A PK MISSION INDIVIDUALLY, THE STATE OR BUREAU ONE MUST REPLACE THAT INDIVIDUAL FOR THE TIME THEY ARE ON ACTIVE DUTY. THE IMPACT ON THE UNITS WITH THE ABSENCE OF A FULL TIME PERSON THERE, IS TO GREAT. THEREFORE THEY "MUST" BE SUBSTITUTED IN THEIR ABSENCE.

042 033 3 3 39

MY SINGLE BIGGEST PROBLEM WITH THE SINAI MISSION WAS THAT WE DIDN'T PULL FROM A LARGE ENOUGH BASE OF PROSPECTS TO START WITH GENERAL OFFICER VISITS TO DRUM UP VOLUNTEERS PRODUCED LARGE NUMBERS. INITIALLY, BUT THEN LEFT US IN A POSITION WHERE SELECTION QUALITY SUFFERED TO PRODUCE ENOUGH VOLUNTERS. AND FOR MY UNIT (ASSUMED CMD 10/94) THIS LED TO A HIGH NUMBER OF WASH-OUTS (5 OF 11)

045 012 3 1 39

MORE FAMILY CONTACT DURING THE TOUR OF DUTY. REDUCE THE TIME FROM 12 MONTHS TO 6 MONTHS OR TO 3 MONTHS.

Senior Leaders' Recruitment Recommendations

049 083 3 2 39

ALLOW INPUT FROM COMPANY COMMANDERS ON WHICH SOLDIERS SHOULD GO.

051 091 3 3 39

ONE BATTALION COULD HAVE BEEN CHOSEN TO DUE THE MISSION.

057 092 3 3 39

YES, ACTIVATE A FULL BATTALION FOR A PEACE KEEPING MISSION. IF THIS UNIT COULD BE ACTIVATED AS A BATTALION INSTEAD OF VOLUNTEERING, THE SOLDIERS WOULD BE WILLING TO GO. (I UNDERSTAND THAT CURRENT LAW DOES NOT ALLOW THIS. "VOLUNTEERING" DISRUPTS SOLDIERS LIVES TOO MUCH. UNLESS A SOLDIER IS UNEMPLOYED OR TRANSITIONING FROM A JOB MY SOLDIERS DID NOT VOLUNTEER.

060 034 3 2 39

VISITS FROM UN, DA, 82ID(AA) OUTLINING THE MISSION (HISTORY, ETC). VISITS FROM OFFICERS, NCO'S FM'S WHO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE MISSION IN THE PAST TO BRIEF THEIR COUNTERPARTS ON THE MISSION. SOLDIERS OF C/3/116 ARE MORE INCLINED TO LISTEN TO THEIR PEERS WHO HAVE FIRST HAND EXPERIENCE WITH THE MISSION THEY ARE ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN.

064 084 3 3 39

VIDEOS OR PICTURES COULD HAVE BEEN SHOWN TO THE UNITS. MEMBERS FROM THE PK MISSION COULD GIVE THE BRIEFING TO ESTABLISH A BOND BETWEEN THE VOLUNTEERING UNITS.

067 041 3 3 39

ESTABLISH A SCREENING/INTERVIEW ORGANIZATION THAT FILLED THE BN POSITIONS W- THE MOST/BEST QUALIFIED SOLDIERS. (REPLACEMENT CO/BN) THE STARC SHOULD REQUIRE AN APFT & WEIGHIN BY UNIT/STATE PRIOR TO SOLDIERS RECEIVING ORDERS & SHIPPING TO FT. BRAGG. ESTABLISH MILESTONES THAT OPEN A WINDOW TO NATIONWIDE CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS UPON A PREDETERMINED PERCENT OF UNIT FILL.

Senior Leaders' Recruitment Recommendations

075 062 3 2 39

INCREASED LONGER TERM BENEFITS, SHORTER DURATION, USE OF OUR BATTALION AS THE "FLAG" FOR THE MFO UNIT.

077 054 3 2 39

PROVIDE UNIT AND SOLDIERS ACCURATE TIME TABLE AND SELECTION CRITERIA; ESPECIALLY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS PRIORITIES OF SELECTION TO SPECIFIC UNIT. NOTIFY SOLDIERS OF SELECTION 90 DAYS PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT.

080 023 3 2 39

THE GREATEST FIASCO IS THAT AFTER THE FIRST ANNOUNCEMENTS AND BRIEFINGS, WE WERE TOLD ONLY A LIMITED NUMBER WOULD BE SELECTED - SEVERAL WHO WANTED TO GO WERE DENIED - THEN JUST BEFORE THE CALL TO ACTIVE DUTY, WE WERE SUDDENLY APPROACHED AND URGENTLY PRESSED TO PROVIDE MORE TROOPS, AT THIS POINT IT WAS JUST TOO LATE IN THE GAME FOR MOST TO RECONSIDER.

086 022 3 3 39

DISCUSSIONS ABOUT HOW OR WHAT SUPPORT WOULD BE PROVIDED FOR TRANSITION BACK INTO THE CIVILIAN WORLD AND TRADITIONAL GUARD STATUS. (CONT) I AM VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THESE YOUNG MEN, AND THEIR ABILITY TO RECEIVE TRANSITION SUPPORT AND THE TIME TO SEND OUT RESUMES AND MAKE CALLS TO POTENTIAL EMPLOYERS. IF WE DO NOT TREAT THIS MATTER SERIOUSLY, WE WILL HAVE A PROBLEM WITH DISSATISFACTION BY SOLDIERS WHO PERFORMED THIS DUTY. TRUST ME, THESE YOUNG MEN AND THEIR FEELINGS ABOUT THEIR GUARD EXPERIENCE, IMPACTS MY STRENGTH. I DON'T MIND GIVING THEM UP, BUT LET'S DO THEM AN EXTRA BENEFIT BY NOT JUST DUMPING THEM BACK ON THEIR DOOR STEPS. IF THERE IS ALREADY A QUALITY PLAN, THEN DISREGARD THIS COMMENT. THANK YOU.

096 073 3 2 39

LIASON FROM PARENT ORGANIZATION BRIEF THE COMPANY AND ANSWER QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR.



## Senior Leaders' Recruitment Recommendations

098 081 3 3 39

BETTER EXPLANATION OF BENEFITS AND REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS.

101 071 3 3 39

NO IMPROVEMENT NEEDED.

61 063 3 39

MORE INFO SOONER. DETAILS CAME LATE.

001 081 4 3 39

MORE ADVANCED NOTICE.

004 011 4 2 39

WE HAD A PROBLEM WITH THE DIVISION MOARE, FINDING FACILITIES FOR PERSONNEL AND FAMILIES. BETTER COMMO FROM DIVISION TO BDE.

022 021 4 2 39

THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS SHOULD HAVE SCREENED RECRUITS EARLIER AND STAYED WITH THE PROCESS WITHIN THE DIVISION RIGHT UP UNTIL THE FINAL BRIEFINGS. THEY SHOULD NOT HAVE WAITED UNTIL SEPTEMBER TO HAVE MAIN BRIEFING BEFORE AN OCTOBER 1ST DEPLOYMENT DATE TO FT. BRAGG. DUE TO THIS, OUR DIVISION HAD TO SEEK OUTSIDE RECRUITS FROM OTHER STATE NATIONAL GUARDS BECAUSE THE 29TH COULD NOT FILL ALL THE SLOTS AVAILABLE. I FELT THIS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF OUR DIVISION HQ'S WOULD HAVE PLANNED BETTER.

032 031 4 2 39

THE LEVEL OF COMMITMENT VARIED TREMENDOUSLY AT THE BEGINNING. I THINK THE SCREENING PROCESS MUST IMPROVE. A LOT OF PRESSURE WAS APPLIED TO GET THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF VOLUNTEERS. TOO MUCH TIME BETWEEN THE INITIAL BRIEFING AND THE TIME OF DEPLOYMENT TO FT. BRAGG. THE SOLDIERS ONCE SCREENED SHOULD BEGIN TRAINING TOGETHER AS UNIT IMMEDIATELY

Senior Leaders' Recruitment Recommendations

072 044 4 2 39

NOTICE TO SOLDIERS OF CONSIDERATION AND SELECTION WAS EXTREMELY LATE, MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR SOME SOLDIERS TO GO (ONE NCO WAS TOLD LESS THAN 2 WEEKS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT, AND HAD TO DECLINE).

090 061 4 2 39

ANNOUNCEMENT OF MISSION AND TIME FOR DEPLOYMENT SHORTENED. 17 YEARS HAVE A LIMITED FOCUS/ATTENTION SPAN.

002 031 5 2 39

AFTER INITIAL VOLUNTEERING THE DIVISION SHOULD HAVE BEGUN TO CHECK ON THE STATUS REGULARLY. PROBABLY IN JULY OR AUGUST A PROVISIONAL UNIT SHOULD HAVE BEEN FORMED FOR DRILL TO READY THE SOLDIERS FOR THE ASSESSMENT. IF THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN DONE THE DIV WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO "SHOCKED" WHEN SOME SOLDIERS BACKED OUT.

039 041 5 2 39

ADVANCED NOTICE- SOLDIERS HAD LITTLE TIME TO MAKE THE DECISION. NOW THAT THE FIRST ONE IS IN PROGRESS ITS VETERANS SHOULD BE USED TO SELL FUTURE ROTATIONS.

048 081 5 3 39

HAVE FORMER PARTICIPANTS ON THE MISSION AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE TRUTHFUL ANSWERS TO POTENTIAL RECRUITS QUESTIONS. ALSO INSURE THERE IS A CHANCE FOR EACH SOLDIER TO COMPLETE JUMP SCHOOL. I BELIEVE THE RECRUITS WOULD REPORT 3 WEEKS EARLY TO GO. ALSO IT WOULD GIVE THEM A VISUAL REWARD FOR ATTENDANCE. THE BOOST TO MORALE WOULD BE WORTH THE COST.

066 091 5 3 39

NONE THAT COMES TO MIND. THE PROCESS WAS ORDERLY AND EFFECTIVE.

Senior Leaders' Recruitment Recommendations

068 061 5 3 39

MOBILIZE THE ENTIRE UNIT RATHER THAN ASKING FOR INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTEERS. MORE SUPPORT IS GIVEN BY FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS IF SOLDIERS ARE ORDERED TO DUTY RATHER THAN VOLUNTEER.

070 011 5 3 39

MORE NOTICE TO SOLDIERS; QUICKER DETERMINATION OF APPLICATION OF ARMY STANDARDS TO DETERMINE HEIGHT/WEIGHT.

095 051 5 2 39

FOR WHATEVER REASON, PERHAPS BECAUSE MY BATTALION AND THE 2ND BRIGADE IS DUE TO BE DEACTIVATED, SOLDIERS IN OUR 2ND BRIGADE WERE NOT NOTIFIED THE WERE SELECTED TO GO UNTIL VERY LATE (ABOUT AUGUST, 1994). AS A RESULT MANY OF OUR YOUNG SOLDIERS HAD TO MAKE DECISIONS TO DO OTHER THINGS SUCH AS ENROLL FOR THE FALL SEMISTER OF COLLEGE. THEN WHEN MORE SOLDIERS WERE NEEDED, WE BEAT THE BUSHES FOR EVEN MORE VOLUNTEERS, SOME OF WHOM WERE SENT HOME WHEN THEY REPORTED FOR DUTY. SOLDIERS WERE RIGHTFULLY ANGRY. THE 29THID(L) SHOULD INFORM SOLDIERS PROMPTLY THAT THEY HAVE BEEN SELECTED OR REJECTED AND THEN STICK WITH IT.